Here’s my take on third-party releases in a bankruptcy plan [not that anyone asked]:

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.

And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).

Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):

When do amounts owed to a company constitute ‘circulating assets’ and how should they be distributed? This crucial question has not always been answered predictably in recent cases. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Resilient Investment Group Pty Ltd v Barnet and Hodgkinson as liquidators of Spitfire Corporation Limited (in liq) [2023] NSWCA 118 has provided a framework for navigating the relevant principles in the context of a priority dispute over R&D tax refunds.

Key takeaways

In this week’s TGIF, we consider Hutton, in the matter of Caydon Flemington Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers appointed) (In liq) [2023] FCA 796, a Federal Court decision concerning the grant of an extension after the ‘critical time’ for the vesting of a security interest.

Key takeaways

Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.

We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]

What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Eligibility Issue & Standards

The Evergreen issue is this: