The Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020 (Coronavirus Response Bill) was passed on 23 March 2020 and received Royal Assent on 24 March 2020 following the Federal Government’s announcements made between 12 and 22 March 2020 of its economic response to the spread of the coronavirus pandemic.

The Coronavirus Response Bill provides, amongst other legislative amendments, for temporary changes of 6 months’ duration to Australian insolvency and corporations laws to assist in managing the sudden economic shock resulting from COVID-19.

In its recent decision in the ongoing Solar Shop litigation,[1] the Full Federal Court established two key principles which will have significant ongoing implications for the conduct of unfair preference claims:

THE ISSUE

In a recent judgment, i.e., on 17 January 2020, the Indian appellate insolvency tribunal, namely, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) held in M. Ravindranath Reddy v. G. Kishan, that the lease of immovable property cannot be considered as supply of goods or rendering any services and therefore the due amount cannot fall within the definition of operational debt under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).

In the winter of 2015, the Indian Legislature sought to tackle the persistent problem of bad debts affecting Indian financial institutions and trade creditors by enacting the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”), which was finally notified in May 2016. The key purpose of the enactment was to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for maximization of value of assets of such persons / entities. 

In Carrello,^[1] the Federal Court granted a warrant under section 530C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) allowing the liquidator of Drilling Australia Pty Ltd (the Company) to search and seize property, books and records located in storage containers belonging to the Company.

The Federal Court has considered whether a deed of company arrangement (DoCA) binds a regulator. The case involved an application by the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) for leave to proceed against a company in liquidation. The Court rejected the company’s argument that the FWO’s claims were extinguished by the DoCA and granted the FWO leave to pursue the claim. The outcome of the proceedings may impact the types of, and circumstances in which, claims by a regulator will not be extinguished by a DoCA.

In a decision of the Federal Court handed down on 18 October 2019 in Masters v Lombe (Liquidator); In the Matter of Babcock & Brown Limited (In Liquidation) [2019] FCA 1720, Foster J held that Babcock & Brown Limited (BBL) did not breach the continuous disclosure obligations in the Corporations Act 2001 and the ASX Listing Rules.

How should the liquidator of an insolvent trustee company ensure payment out of trust assets of the entirety of his or her remuneration and expenses?

In its much anticipated decision, the High Court has unanimously dismissed the Amerind appeal.[1] This decision finally resolves recent uncertainty as to the proper application of trust assets in the liquidation of an insolvent corporate trustee.

In short, the High Court’s decision confirms that in the winding up of a corporate trustee:

The significance of this decision

On 3 May 2019, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an application brought by the administrators of an oil and gas exploration company, Paltar Petroleum Limited (Paltar) to adjourn proceedings for the winding-up of the company in insolvency. The decision illustrates that the belated appointment of administrators appointed by directors in response to pending winding-up proceedings is unlikely to keep at bay the approaching fire of liquidation; indeed, it may accelerate it.

Background