The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted, amongst others, to facilitate timely insolvency resolution. While the Supreme Court has always upheld the sanctity of timelines under the Code for corporate insolvency resolution, it has held the prescribed timelines for actions prior to the commencement of the corporate insolvency process as merely directory. This article explores the impact of such decisions on the proceedings under the Code which already suffer from inordinate delays.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was enacted to facilitate insolvency resolution in a timebound manner, and maximise value realisation for stakeholders. Although it has been amended 6 times since its notification, issues remain. As the Legislature appears set to amend the Code once again, this article examines stakeholders’ issues and explores the issues the amendments may address.

This article was first published in India Business Law Journal on 4 March 2022

In 2018, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was amended to enable the withdrawal of admitted applications for the initiation of corporate insolvency resolution. Such, withdrawal applications have been subject to greater scrutiny from the adjudicating authority and the committee of creditors where they involve promoters seeking to regain control of corporate debtors.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led successful resolution applicants to seek withdrawals of, or modifications to, approved resolution plans. This article examines the Supreme Court’s recent judgment on claims of force majeure in the resolution process of Amtek Auto.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was enacted to enable corporate insolvency resolution of financially stressed corporate debtors in a time bound manner, so as to maximise the value of their assets. The decision to rehabilitate or liquidate a corporate debtor lies with the committee of creditors (Committee), comprising the corporate debtor’s financial creditors. The Code allows the Committee sufficient freedom and flexibility to explore, negotiate and, subsequently, choose the most suitable option for the corporate debtor.

This is often a question for faced by office-holders of insolvent companies when investigating a company’s affairs, and more of a concern for former directors and shareholders when potentially facing a claim for the return of unlawful dividends or misfeasance.

TV rental business, Box Clever, was created as a joint venture between Granada (now ITV) and Thorn (now Carmelite).

The Box Clever business was later sold and administrative receivers were subsequently appointed over Box Clever companies.

The Pensions Regulator (“TPR”) issued Financial Support Directives (“FSDs”) against five ITV companies in relation to the Box Clever defined benefit pension scheme. ITV referred the determinations to the Upper Tribunal.

In the wake of the Carillion insolvency and the Toys R Us administration, there are contrasting tales from two different UK businesses.

The engineering business Rolls-Royce is going against the trend and has announced that it will keep its defined benefits pension scheme open for current members until January 2024.

The scheme is running at a £1.4 billion surplus, which will also allow the company to decrease its contributions to its defined benefit retirement fund by £145 million over the next three years.

At the start of 2017, UK businesses had reported a 33% risk of insolvency, compared to the end of 2017 which saw that figure increase to nearly 40%.

These figures were calculated by drawing together key performance indicators including balance sheets and records of the directors’ successful (or unsuccessful) directorship history.