Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?
Getting to the top
The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.
Background
To secure an order for the #winding-up of a Quasi-Partnership company on the Just& Equitable ground, is it necessary only to show that mutual trust and confidence between the shareholders/quasi-partners has broken down? Hardwicke investigates the recent case of Badyal v Badyal & Ors [2019] EWCA Civ 1644
Background
2018 was seen by many as the ‘year of the CVA’ and the year of the so -called ‘Retail CVA’ in particular. Such CVAs have been used in an attempt by companies operating in the retail and casual dining sector with burdensome leases to reduce the cost of their premises whilst continuing to trade.
2019 was widely expected to be the year in which there was a challenge by a landlord under s.6 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘the Act’) to the use of CVAs to force a rent reduction, without comparable cuts to other creditors and so it has proved.
The recent case of Sell Your Car With Us Ltd v Anil Sareen will be of interest to practitioners in Corporate Insolvency as it provides a useful reminder that there is no strict rule that the winding up procedure is inapt for mere debt collection.
The Facts:
The creditor (“AS”) had engaged the debtor company (“SYC”) to sell his Maserati Levante sports car and on completion of the sale to deposit the proceeds in his bank account. Communications were agreed to be conducted by email.
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.
The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.
Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?