The High Court confirmed that it is generally not appropriate to present a winding up petition to recover sums due under a construction contract, particularly where those sums are disputed or there is a legitimate cross claim.
A professional negligence claim against trustees in bankruptcy alleging that they had unnecessarily prolonged the bankruptcies and caused the bankrupts’ loss failed. The Trustees had agreed not to take steps in the bankruptcies while Dr Oraki and her husband made repeated applications to set aside the judgment upon which their bankruptcy orders were made and annul their bankruptcies under s 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, which they eventually succeeded in doing.
'B’ appealed an Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) s 279(3) order suspending her discharge from bankruptcy until ‘T’ confirmed B had complied with her IA 1986 duties. B traded through a company, which entered voluntary liquidation in November 2014. B’s personal guarantee of company debt led to a bankruptcy order in February 2015.
This case arose from the ongoing administration of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (‘LBIE’). The appeal considered the proper ranking of certain subordinated debt in the insolvency ‘waterfall’, among other matters.
Held
The first issue concerned the construction of debt instruments subordinated to amounts ‘payable in the insolvency’. It was held that such amounts included statutory interest and non-provable debts, and accordingly those liabilities must be met before any balance could be used to pay off the subordinated loans.
The Defendant (‘D’) was a director of the Claimant, (‘RHIL’) and its subsidiary, (‘BTSC’), which provided training courses. In 2010 D appointed MG as administrator of BTSC and MG arranged a pre-pack sale of the business. The purchaser paid nothing for the business but assumed responsibility for the training, thereby limiting BTSC’s liability for course fee refunds.
Since 1956, legislation has required suretyship agreements to be embodied in a written document. A suretyship agreement involves three parties; simplistically if A does not pay B, then C will. C will step into the shoes of A and perform A’s obligations for them.
This article was first published in Insolvency Intelligence 2017, 30(5), 85-87.
In an earlier edition of this publication I identified what appeared to be a growing trend for the making of a draconian form of order suspending the discharge of bankruptcies. This form of order is typically associated with the case of Mawer v Bland where Mrs Justice Rose upheld on appeal the following order made by Chief Registrar Baister:
The introduction of business rescue proceedings by Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) created uncertainty on various levels, in particular the extent and nature of certain rights previously enjoyed by creditors.
Our courts are making progress in finding a path through the muddy waters in this regard and every day a judgment is delivered that sheds some light on previous uncertain propositions.
In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).