With the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bresco Electrical Services Ltd v Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd just a few weeks old, it is hardly surprising that people are looking again at the relationship between insolvency law and adjudication, noting that in cases of liquidation where parties have a cross claim, construction law defers to insolvency law.

This was clearly illustrated in Gregg Nowak Ltd v CSS Electrical Distributors Ltd, which came before HHJ Bailey earlier this month.

Background

This was a conjoined appeal alongside Bresco v Lonsdale. In this case, Cannon and Primus had already participated in an adjudication, with the decision of the adjudicator favouring Primus. Primus would later enter into a Company Voluntary Arrangement.

The CVA was made on the basis that, although Primus was insolvent at the time, it would be able to satisfy its creditors if it were able to recover from Cannon and other third parties through litigation and adjudication. This was preferable to liquidation.

Insolvency Set-Off and Construction Contract Adjudications in light of Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v Michael J Lonsdale (electrical) Ltd; Cannon Corporate Ltd v Primus Build Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 27

This case concerned both the appeal in Bresco v Lonsdale and Cannon Corporate v Primus Build. The present case comment is only concerned with the former.

Background

Bresco appealed to set aside the order of an injunction from Fraser J. That injunction prevented the continuation of an adjudication in which Bresco and Lonsdale (in liquidation) sought sums from each other in claims and cross-claims.

Introduction

The recent decision of Andrew Burrows QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, in Palliser Limited v Fate Limited (In Liquidation) [2019] EWHC 43 (QB), is a useful reminder of the difficulties that can arise where one party (here a tenant) relies on another (its landlord) to take out insurance.

The Facts

In 2010, a fire started at the ground floor restaurant owned and operated by a company called Fate Limited (“Fate”). It was not in dispute that the fire was caused by Fate’s negligence.

The Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) commenced operation on 30 January 2012. All seven-year registrations made on the:

1. old state-based motor vehicle registers, immediately before the PPSR commenced; or
2. PPSR immediately after it commenced,

will begin to expire shortly and this will have adverse consequences for secured parties who do not act to renew.

Re SHB Realisation Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd); Wright and another (as joint liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd (formerly BHS Ltd)) v Prudential Assurance Companies Ltd [2018] EWHC 402 (Ch); [2018] All ER (D) 58 (Mar)

Synopsis

Daniel Gatty discusses the recent High Court ruling in Leon v Her Majesty’s Attorney General and others [2018] EWHC 3026 (Ch) and its impact on the grant of vesting orders following the disclaimer of a lease.

Readers of this column will be aware of the complications that can ensue when a lease is disclaimed by a tenant’s liquidator under section 178 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), by a tenant’s trustee in bankruptcy under section 315 of the IA 1986 or by the Crown under section 1013 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) following dissolution of a tenant company.

This is the third occasion on which I have posted on this blog on the issue of after the event insurance (ATE) policies and the impact which they have on applications for security for costs.

In the first post on 16 November 2017, I praised the judgment of Snowden J in Premier Motorauctions v Pricewaterhouse Coopers for appearing to bring clarity to an area which had for some time struggled with near irreconcilable decisions.

The latest decision in the external administration ofMirabela is a reminder of the utility of the section 424 directions process for receivers, and an example of the steps to be taken in the face of competing asset claims.

The Court directed that the receivers of Mirabela were justified in distributing sale proceeds of approximately US$59.5 million in the face of a third party claim to the proceeds, provided the receivers first gave 21 days’ notice of intent to do so.

The case is a timely reminder that: