“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.

And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).

Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):

Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.

We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]

What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Eligibility Issue & Standards

The Evergreen issue is this:

In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?

The High Court has considered the point at which the directors’ duty to consider the interests of creditors arose in the context of a tax mitigation scheme that ultimately failed

The judge found that the duty to consider creditors’ interests had arisen once the directors had become aware that there was a real risk that the scheme would fail and that the company would therefore be unable to pay its debts.

Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.

Case Law Consensus

Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:

• business assets are fully-liquidated;
• unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
• prospects for resuming such activities are nil.

So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?

I say, “No.”

A Hypothetical

Yesterday, the Supreme Court (SC) handed down judgment in Philipp v Barclays Bank UK Plc [2023] UKSC 25. In summary, the SC found that banks do not owe a duty to refrain from executing customers’ direct payment instructions where there may be an attempt to defraud the customer.

On 7 July 2022, the UK Government published a consultation on changing UK law to implement two model laws in the field of insolvency that have been adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). These are:

The Court of Appeal in Hunt v Ubhi has confirmed that insolvency practitioners seeking freezing orders are subject to the default requirement of providing an unlimited cross-undertaking in damages.

Contrasting opinions from any court, issued a month apart, are always instructive.

And we have a new such thing—from the U.S. Supreme Court, no less, and from May and June of this year. The contrast is on this subject: whether sovereign immunities of Puerto Rico and of a federally recognized tribe are abrogated in bankruptcy.