There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.

The ‘dual jurisdiction’ regime has long been entrenched in South Africa’s corporate insolvency law. This principal arises from the provisions of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Act), which provides that jurisdiction over a company is determined by the location of both its registered address and its principal place of business with the creditor having the choice of jurisdiction.

With the enactment of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (New Act), the question that then follows is: Does this principle of jurisdiction continue to apply under the New Act?

In order for an application for business rescue to successfully suspend commenced liquidation proceedings, it must be served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), together with all affected persons in terms of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act). This position was confirmed in the Gauteng Local Division’s decision handed down on 10 March 2016.

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Lagoon Beach Hotel v Lehane (235/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 2010 (21 December 2015) recently considered the granting of a preservation order to a foreign trustee and the recognition of a foreign trustee by our courts in exceptional circumstances.

One thing we have learnt from the hit series ‘Murder She Wrote’, other than the fact that the star of the show Angela Lansbury never aged during its 12 years of airing, is that it is often the one closest to us that does the most harm.

The restructuring of financially distressed companies is on the increase globally. In line with this international trend is Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) which introduced business rescue into the South African corporate landscape.

Although business rescue has brought a much needed and long overdue alternative to liquidation for businesses in distress, it is also responsible for many points of contention. The most pertinent of these is currently the general moratorium found in s133 of the Act.

Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,¹ wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.

Background

In Aventura², a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.

The South African Revenue Service (SARS) released Binding Private Ruling 210 (Ruling) on 11 November 2015. The Ruling sets out the tax consequences of a ‘liquidation distribution’, as defined in s47(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act), followed by an ‘amalgamation transaction’ as contemplated in s44(1)(a) of the Act.

On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,^[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.