Secured creditors have taken note and expressed concern regarding a recent decision from the Federal Court of Appeal (the “FCA”), which has upended conventional wisdom regarding the priority and treatment of GST/HST arrears in a bankruptcy. In Canada v.
In a September 19, 2017 decision from the bench in the matter of Bank of Montreal v. Kappeler Masonry Corporation, et. al.1 (“Kappeler Masonry”), Madam Justice Conway of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) confirmed that commingling of construction project receipts in a receiver’s estate account is fatal to a Construction Lien Act (Ontario) (the “CLA”) trust claim in the face of a debtor’s bankruptcy.
In what may prove either to be a landmark decision or a mere outliner confined to its unique facts, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the "Court of Appeal") in Romspen Investment Corporation v. Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited, et al.1 has overturned an earlier decision and lifted the stay of proceedings against a court-appointed receiver to allow a union to proceed with a certification application and an unfair labour practice complaint against the receiver.
[2017] EWHC 1206 (Ch)
Deputy Judge Alexander QC had to consider an application for an order that R be restrained from proceeding further with a creditor’s petition to wind up B. The Judge was in no doubt that the application was misconceived. First B was not unable to pay its debts. B on the evidence provided to the court was solvent with cash in hand and a substantial unused credit facility. Further, the reason B had not paid the substantial sums claimed was that it had arguable defences as well as substantial cross-claims of its own. The Judge was clear that:
Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,1 wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.
Background
In Aventura2, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.
On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.
On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.
HHJ Purle had to consider an application for directions by liquidators of WGL, a company which was involved in a construction project for the School under a JCT Intermediate Building Contract (with Contractor’s Design) 2005 as amended. A dispute had arisen as to who owed money to whom, and the court was asked to decide the correct forum for resolving that dispute. According to the liquidators, around £615k was due to WGL, and according to the School, £270k was due to them.
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.