The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.
USDAW v WW Realisation 1 Limited (in Liquidation)
You probably wouldn't recognise it from the case name but this case results from the closure of the much loved and sorely missed Woolworths.
Employers are obliged to carry out collective consultation with appropriate representatives when proposing to dismiss 20 or more employees from an establishment over a 90-day period: the length of the consultation period is dependent on the number of employees being dismissed.
As this note goes to press, there is a fresh round of tenant insolvencies. Administrators are again presenting proposals to landlords that severely reduce their rights to rent and to control who occupies their premises.
We have advised on many such proposals and secured payment of significant sums due to landlords. Don't just accept terms proposed by administrators before taking advice.
In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.
Introduction
In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.
The Insolvency Act 1986 makes provision for, amongst other things, bankruptcy and Debt Relief Orders.
When a person is made bankrupt, his property vests in the trustee in bankruptcy. Some items, however, are excluded from the estate, including any assured or secure tenancy (s283). Once a bankruptcy order has been made, no creditor in respect of a debt provable in the bankruptcy may have any remedy against the property of the bankrupt 'in respect of that debt' (s285(3)(a)).
Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.
As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).
During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.
The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.
Background
In the recent case of Peterborough (City) v. Kawartha Native Housing Society, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to determine: