“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.

And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).

Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):

Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.

We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]

What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Eligibility Issue & Standards

The Evergreen issue is this:

In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?

In recent years much ink has been spilled opining on the so called 'Quincecare' duty of care, and the limits of it (see links to our recent insolvency law updates covering the topic below). The judgment in Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363 was a first instance decision on Steyn J, in which he found that a bank has a duty not to execute a payment instruction given by an agent of its customer without making inquiries if the bank has reasonable grounds for believing that the agent is attempting to defraud the customer.

Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.

Case Law Consensus

Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:

• business assets are fully-liquidated;
• unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
• prospects for resuming such activities are nil.

So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?

I say, “No.”

A Hypothetical

Contrasting opinions from any court, issued a month apart, are always instructive.

And we have a new such thing—from the U.S. Supreme Court, no less, and from May and June of this year. The contrast is on this subject: whether sovereign immunities of Puerto Rico and of a federally recognized tribe are abrogated in bankruptcy.

“Were Congress to . . . intervene and expand § 524(g) beyond asbestos cases, bankruptcy would become a more suitable alternative for resolving mass tort cases. Until then, such cases will likely remain problematic under the Code in the face of creditor opposition.”

Subchapter V of the Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11 is relatively new: it took effect as a new law on February 19, 2020. Accordingly, new questions continue to arise on how its terms and provisions should be applied.

A Trustee Fees Question

One Subchapter V question is this:

• When does a Subchapter V trustee’s administrative claim for fees and costs get paid?

A Regular Chapter 11 Answer

The answer in regular Chapter 11 has always been this:

When a federal court approves a [bankruptcy] plan allowing someone to put its hands into another person’s pockets, the person with the pockets is entitled to be fully heard and to have legitimate objections addressed.[Fn. 1]

Pop Quiz Question:

Does Insurer, in the following facts, have standing to object to Debtor’s Chapter 11 plan?

Debtor is in bankruptcy because of asbestos lawsuits.

Debtor proposes a Chapter 11 plan that is supported by all constituencies—except one:

Feasibility of a bankruptcy plan is always a tough issue.

Think about it:

• debtors are in bankruptcy because they can’t make their payments when due; and
• in bankruptcy, a debtor must propose a plan for paying creditors—that will work this time.

We now have a new plan feasibility opinion—from the Eighth Circuit BAP—that provides guidance to us all.