Bankruptcy and insolvency professionals should take note of two recent Ontario Superior Court decisions that put professional fees in the spotlight. TNG Acquisition Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 2754 [Commercial List] (“TNG Acquisition”) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONSC 365 (“Diemer”), saw Brown J. and Goodman J., respectively, reduce fees for court-appointed officers and their legal counsel on the basis that the amounts sought were unreasonable in consideration of the work performed.
In its June 11, 2014 decision in Iona Contractors Ltd. (Re), 2014 ABQB 347 (“Iona Contractors”), the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (the “Alberta QB”) held that the trust created by section 22 of the Builders’ Lien Act (Alberta) is not effective in the bankruptcy of a would-be trustee debtor. This result is consistent with, but reached completely independently of, the recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Atlas Block Co.
On Monday, the Supreme Court confirmed1 that bankruptcy courts may hear “Stern-type” matters (such as tortious interference counterclaims) that relate to bankruptcy proceedings, so long as a district court reviews the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings and renders the final decision. Other questions left in the wake of Stern v. Marshall,2 however, remain unanswered and will continue to occupy the attention of parties to bankruptcy matters and courts alike.
BACKGROUND: IN THE WAKE OF STERN V. MARSHALL
In his recent decision inRoyal Bank of Canada v.Atlas Block Co. Limited, 2014 ONSC 3062 (“Atlas Block”), Justice Penny of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) held that trust claims pursuant to section 8 of the Construction Lien Act (Ontario) (the “CLA”) do not survive the bankruptcy of the would-be trustee debtor.
On December 19, 2013, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “RMV”) cannot deny vehicle permits to individuals on account of pre- bankruptcy debts owing to the ETR Concession Company Limited (the “ETR”). Based on the intent and purpose of federal bankruptcy law to permit debtors to obtain a “fresh start,” it was concluded that the provincial act establishing the ETR conflicts with bankruptcy law and was, as a result, unconstitutional in part.
Background
A recent appellate decision in the Western District of Washington prohibited hedge fund creditors from voting on a debtor’s chapter 11 plan on the basis that the funds did not qualify as “financial institutions” for purposes of the definition of “Eligible Assignee” under the applicable loan agreement.1 While this counter-intuitive result seems driven by the specific facts of that case, this decision serves as a useful reminder of the importance of carefully reviewing assignment restrictions when purchasing loans in the secondary market.
The French government has recently published a new regulation (ordonnance n°2014-326 dated March 12, 2014) amending France’s bankruptcy law. Its aim is to facilitate further restructurings of French companies, in particular with respect to pre-insolvency consensual restructurings, and to give creditors a greater say in the restructuring process.
PRE-INSOLVENCY CONSENSUAL RESTRUCTURINGS
Chapter 11 has long been used by companies to obtain relief from legacy tort liabilities. There has been a lingering question, however, as to whether chapter 11 can bar claims by tort litigants who were exposed to a hazardous material or defective product before bankruptcy but do not develop injuries until after the case is over. Some debtors have set up trusts and appointed representatives for so-called “future claimants”: this approach can be effective, but may add months or years to a bankruptcy case along with significant cost, business disruption and litigation.
On January 10, 2014, in a closely watched case, Judge George Hodges of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled that Garlock Sealing Technologies, Inc.
In a recent opinion on an issue of first impression,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that foreign entities seeking recognition under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code must, in addition to satisfying the requirements for recognition set forth in that chapter, have a residence, domicile, place of business or assets in the United States.