The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act¹ (the “CCAA”) is by far the most flexible Canadian law under which a corporation can restructure its business. When compared against theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act² (the “BIA”), the CCAA looks like a blank canvass and lends itself well to invention and mutual compromise.

The Supreme Court may revisit two of the many questions left open by its much-discussed decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), an opinion famous not only for its subject – the estate of the late actress and model Anna Nicole Smith – but also for redefining the allocation of judicial authority between an Article III federal district court and a bankruptcy court. Appellants have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.

A recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York¹ found that a UCC-3 termination statement filed on behalf of a secured creditor was not effective because it lacked the proper authorization.

On February 1, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) released its long-awaited decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers. By a five to two majority, the SCC allowed the appeal from the 2011 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) which had created so much uncertainty about the priority of pension claims in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings.

In October 2012, The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. (“Futura”) commenced proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). On November 13, 2012, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) considered Futura’s request to permit pre-filing, prepayment obligations to its key customers.

On January 27, 2012, Justice Newbould of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) released his decision in Temple (Re),1 holding that the Ontario Limitations Act, 20022 (the “Act”) does not apply to a bankruptcy application and does not operate to extinguish a debt owing to a creditor.

The Ontario Limitations Act, 2002

Introduction

Does the dissolution of a corporation that is in receivership terminate the receivership? Until the recent decision of Meta Energy Inc. v. Algatec Solarwerke Brandenberg GMBH, 2012 ONSC 175, 2012 ONSC 4873, there was no previous court decision directly on point. The answer to the question is “no.”

Background

A recent case illustrates the importance of clarity in the contractual arrangements associated with the disposition of a debtor’s assets. In the case, the Court appointed receiver was given Court approval for an auction services agreement. Under that agreement, the auctioneer was to conduct an auction sale of the debtor’s assets and was entitled to charge and collect a buyer’s premium equal to a minimum of 12% of the sales price.

The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held recently that § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code does not limit the potential recovery on fraudulent transfer claims to the amount of unpaid creditor claims against a debtor’s estate. According to the Court, the language in § 550(a) that states that a plaintiff in an avoidance action can recover the property transferred or the value of the property “for the benefit of the estate” provides a “floor” rather than a “ceiling” on recovery.