On July 31, 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered its decision in Ridel v. Goldberg, clarifying the interplay of the various provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002 at play in circumstances where judgment creditors are allowed to take proceedings in their own name pursuant to an order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Facts

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

In the recent decision of Edmonton (City) v Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc., 2019 ABCA 109, the Alberta Court of Appeal has concluded that fees and costs incurred by a court-appointed receiver should have priority over all claims by secured creditors, including special liens in favour of municipalities for unpaid property taxes. This is an important decision for the insolvency bar and provides some much needed comfort to receivers that their fees and costs will be protected by the court-ordered charge.

The Decision

The Defendant was a dentist who had executed a personal guarantee on July 7, 2011 in favour of the Plaintiff (the "Bank") in order to secure payment of the indebtedness of the Defendant's professional corporation. The Bank made a demand for payment on the guarantee, and subsequently brought an action against the Defendant (the "First Action").The Bank was successful on a motion for summary judgment and judgment was granted against the Defendant.

The Federal Court of Australia in Kaboko Mining Limited v Van Heerden (No 3) [2018] FCA 2055 handed down a significant decision which clarified the operation of "insolvency exclusion" clauses in a D&O liability insurance policy. The issue arose after Administrators commenced proceedings against four former directors of the company, and the insurer relied on an insolvency exclusion to decline to indemnify the former directors in respect of the claims made in the proceedings.

The facts