After several years of unusually few corporate defaults, there has recently been an uptick in corporations failing to satisfy their bond and loan obligations. In a number of cases, the debts in question are part of multiple-lien or multi-tranche financing structures that incorporate complex subordination packages. The agreements at issue often go beyond merely subordinating rights to payments.
It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.
It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?
In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court recently handed down a decision dealing with the constitutionality of one of the timeframes set by the Bankruptcy Law for filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings.
An administrator who was sued in relation to contractual liabilities which he entered as administrator of a company was found to have no personal liability for those contracts or for the costs of the litigation.
In the recent case of Wright Hassall LLP v Morris1 the claimant advanced various arguments in an attempt to make the administrator personally liable for a costs order in litigation where the defendant companies were unable to pay. These arguments were rejected.
Asbestos settlement trusts are a major source of payment of asbestos claims in the United States, with over fifty such trusts instituted as of March, 2011.1 While insurance recoveries are a principal source of funding for these trusts, courts generally have not allowed insurers to challenge chapter 11 plans where they are found to be “insurance neutral.” A plan is insurance neutral where the plan does not increase an insurer’s pre-petition liabilities or impair an insurer’s contractual rights under its insurance policies.
The High Court has held that where litigation is commenced against the administrator of a company, arising out of contractual obligations entered into in that capacity, he or she will not be personally liable, despite the insolvent company being unable to meet the resulting liability.(1)
The courts and FOS are now headed down very different paths in their approach to credit crunch losses suffered by clients of regulated firms. While FOS has all but abandoned the general law of causation in its approach to cases of consumer detriment, we have observed how the courts have held again and again that the general law of causation applies to mis-selling claims.
The Supreme Court yesterday ruled that client money held in un-segregated accounts should be treated the same as client money held in segregated accounts, enabling un-segregated account holders to share in the client money pool on the insolvency of a firm with whom the account is held.