The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.
Unless you are a specialized lender who makes loans to debtors-in-possession, you do not make a loan with the expectation that your borrower is going to file bankruptcy. Although the number of bankruptcy filings in California and nationally is trending slightly lower, filings remain at higher than normal levels. Nearly every lender has received the notice of a bankruptcy filing that was unexpected and then faced decisions as to what to do next.
In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.
Introduction
In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.
This past quarter end once again reminded us that the economy remains weak and borrowers who have managed to hang on for the past three or four years are running out of staying power. The topic again arose - what to do when a borrower files bankruptcy? Faced with the prospect of throwing good money after bad, some lenders bury their head in the sand and simply wait it out, often with terrible results. Others charge ahead aggressively and run up large legal bills that are not justified by the amount of the obligation or the difficulty of recovery.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California recently held that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a borrower can void a trustee sale even where the petition is filed after the trustee sale, so long as the borrower files the petition before the execution of the trustee's deed upon sale. In re: Gonzales 2011 WL3328508 (Bkrtcy. C.D.Cal. August 1, 2011).
Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.
As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).
During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.
The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.
Background
In the recent case of Peterborough (City) v. Kawartha Native Housing Society, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to determine: