Leisure Norwich (2) Ltd & Others v Luminar Lava Ignite Limited & Others - [2012] EWHC 951(Ch). Incurring liabilities to third parties is often necessary in order to carry out an effective administration of an insolvent company.

The UK Supreme Court's decision in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) caps the extensive litigation which developed in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (Lehman Brothers) almost four years ago.

It all began on 15 September 2008 when Lehman Brothers went into administration following what the Courts have referred to as its performance failures on 'a truly spectacular scale', foremost of which was the failure to protect its clients' monies.

There are some strict rules which apply when an individual is made bankrupt. Some of them were brought to the fore recently in the case of Floyd Foster v Davenport Lyons (A Firm) in the Chancery Division EWHC 275 (Ch).

The main cardinal rules are:

The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

In a major victory for secured creditors, the United States Supreme Court, on May 29, 2012, unanimously held that a chapter 11 plan involving a sale of secured property must afford the secured creditor the right to credit bid for the property under section 363(k) of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).¹ In so holding, the Supreme Court resolved the split that had emerged among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, as illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s decision below,² which contrasted with recent decisions from the Third and Fifth Circui

BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)

Background

In October 2009, the court overseeing the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Florida (Bankruptcy Court) set off considerable alarm bells throughout the lending community when it unraveled a refinancing transaction as a fraudulent conveyance based upon, in primary part, the fact that certain subsidiaries of TOUSA, Inc. pledged their assets as collateral for a new loan that was used to repay prior debt on which the subsidiaries were not liable, and that was not secured by those subsidiaries’ assets.

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.