Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,1 wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.
Background
In Aventura2, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.
On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.
Twin rulings by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the first of which was issued in December 2014 and the second issued on June 23rd of this year, have created great uncertainty in the bond market regarding whether, when and to what extent Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”) may now be used by minority bondholders to block out-of-court restructurings, notwithstanding that a particular restructuring is consistent with the provisions of the relevant indenture.
On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.
On May 4, 2015, in the case Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, the United States Supreme Court held that debtors in chapter 13 (and presumably chapter 9 and 11 as well) are not entitled as of right to immediately appeal bankruptcy court orders denying confirmation of a proposed plan of reorganization. This ruling, although consistent with a majority of circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue, reversed governing precedent in several circuit courts—including the Third Circuit, which reviews Delaware bankruptcy court decisions.
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.
Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) in 306440 Ontario Ltd. v. 782127 Ontario Ltd.1 serves as a cautionary reminder to secured creditors that their position may not always be at the top of the insolvency food chain, even when they have taken all the proper steps to perfect their security interests.
On December 1, 2014, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court of Appeal”) released its decision, written for the Court of Appeal by Madam Justice Pepall, in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONCA 851 (“Diemer”). The Court of Appeal dismissed the court-appointed receiver’s (the “Receiver”) appeal of the order of Justice Goodman, which, among other things, reduced the fees of counsel (“Counsel”) to the Receiver.