La apreciación de mala fe a efectos de subordinación del crédito de la contraparte a la restitución en caso de rescisión exige, además de conocer la situación de insolvencia o proximidad a la insolvencia del deudor, la concurrencia de un aspecto subjetivo (conciencia de que se afecta negativamente –perjuicio- a los demás acreedores) y de un aspecto objetivo (valorativo de la conducta del acreedor, consistente en que esta sea merecedora de la repulsa ética en el tráfico jurídico).
La caducidad del cargo de administrador se produce ope legis, sin necesidad de que acceda al Registro Mercantil ningún documento que lo constate. En estos casos, a diferencia del cese o la separación, el inicio del plazo de prescripción de la acción de responsabilidad contra el administrador comienza desde el momento en que deba considerarse caducado el cargo.
Every lender sincerely hopes that, even when its borrower is flat on the floor and seems down for the proverbial count, the borrower will still find the wherewithal to repay it. A lender often starts counting the days after it is repaid until the 90-day preference period (11 U.S.C. §547) has passed. The lender generally breathes a sigh of relief on the 91st day, confident that if its borrower files for bankruptcy, the money paid to the lender is safe from being clawed back by the Bankruptcy Court.
The recently decided case of RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ____ (2012), puts to rest a conflict among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits as to the right of secured creditors to credit bid at a proposed sale of their collateral under a plan of reorganization that the secured creditor opposes. The practice of credit bidding is codified in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. §363(k) and is the right of a secured creditor to bid the amount of its secured debt at a debtor’s sale of the creditor’s collateral in bankruptcy.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, Chapter 183C of the General Laws of Massachusetts, is preempted by the high cost home loan provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) for federally chartered depository institutions. The July 27 ruling came in a case brought by Massachusetts residents who had jointly received a home mortgage loan from a national bank.
In an apparent case of first impression in Massachusetts, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently held that an allonge must be physically affixed to the original promissory note to be effective.
Generally speaking, Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state – meaning that lenders can foreclose on mortgages of Massachusetts property without seeking judicial approval beforehand. In certain circumstances, however, a pre-foreclosure judicial proceeding is required solely to determine whether the borrower is in the active military service and entitled to the protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §532.
A Massachusetts trial court has denied a borrower’s request to stop a foreclosure proceeding despite the borrower’s claim that the loan was “unfair” under the Massachusetts consumer protection law, Chapter 93A of the General Laws. In its May 13 decision denying the borrower’s request for an injunction, the court examined a stated income (no documentation) loan and determined that the borrower was not likely to prevail on a claim that the loan featured a combination of four characteristics that qualify as “unfair” under Chapter 93A.