The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Swart v Starbuck & Others 2016 ZASCA 83, reaffirmed the necessary authorisation for a trustee of an insolvent estate to sell an insolvent estate’s immovable property.
Mr Swart’s estate was finally sequestrated on 1 November 2005. On 24 January 2006, three provisional trustees were appointed by the Master of the High Court. At the time of Mr Swart’s provisional sequestration, he owned certain immovable properties (Properties).
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
Facility agreements ordinarily oblige a borrower to prepay the facility on the occurrence of certain events, including, if a borrower receives insurance proceeds or asset sale proceeds during the loan term. The rationale for this is that lenders wish to use this unexpected windfall to mitigate the risk of non-payment. This is also the approach of the Loan Market Association (LMA) in its standard facility agreements.
Employment contracts were previously deemed to be suspended on the date of liquidation, being the date that the application for liquidation of the company is presented and issued at court in terms of s348 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Companies Act). However, this position has since changed.
Section 133 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 places a general moratorium on legal proceedings, while the company is under business rescue. This provides a company with time and resources to be rehabilitated through the implementation of a business rescue plan. As a result, there is some debate as to whether creditors are precluded from perfecting their security, such as a notarial bond, under business rescue.
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.
On March 23, 2016, the European Commission launched a consultation seeking views on key insolvency principles and standards which could ensure that national insolvency frameworks work in a cross-border context. The consultation is part of the Commission’s Capital Markets Union Action Plan which aims to remove barriers to the free flow of capital. Responses will be used to identify which aspects could be included in a legislative initiative or other related actions.
The ‘dual jurisdiction’ regime has long been entrenched in South Africa’s corporate insolvency law. This principal arises from the provisions of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Act), which provides that jurisdiction over a company is determined by the location of both its registered address and its principal place of business with the creditor having the choice of jurisdiction.
With the enactment of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (New Act), the question that then follows is: Does this principle of jurisdiction continue to apply under the New Act?
In order for an application for business rescue to successfully suspend commenced liquidation proceedings, it must be served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), together with all affected persons in terms of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act). This position was confirmed in the Gauteng Local Division’s decision handed down on 10 March 2016.