A confluence of factors, including high debt, spiraling pension obligations, and lower sales and property tax revenues, has forced more municipalities to face insolvency than any time since the 1930s. The two largest municipal bankruptcies in history — Jefferson County, Ala., and Detroit, Mich. — recently ended. With the economy improving, we may never see the wave of municipal bankruptcies some commentators predicted.
On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the latest installmentin the jurisdictional saga of bankruptcy courts. As the highly anticipatedsequel to Stern v.
The Supreme Court may revisit two of the many questions left open by its much-discussed decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), an opinion famous not only for its subject – the estate of the late actress and model Anna Nicole Smith – but also for redefining the allocation of judicial authority between an Article III federal district court and a bankruptcy court. Appellants have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.
A recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York1 found that a UCC-3 termination statement filed on behalf of a secured creditor was not effective because it lacked the proper authorization.
Generally, license agreements are “executory contracts” in bankruptcy. Executory means performance is due from both sides. When a party to an executory contract becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, it may either reject or assume the contract. However, non-debtor parties (or “counterparties”) enjoy some protections, especially when the contract is a license agreement for intellectual property.
The basics.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held recently that § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code does not limit the potential recovery on fraudulent transfer claims to the amount of unpaid creditor claims against a debtor’s estate. According to the Court, the language in § 550(a) that states that a plaintiff in an avoidance action can recover the property transferred or the value of the property “for the benefit of the estate” provides a “floor” rather than a “ceiling” on recovery.