The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.

Since the European Commission adopted the recommendation on restructuring and second chance in 2014, it has been working on the evaluation of its initiative and the introduction of a European legal framework. In 2015 the Capital Markets Union Action Plan included the announcement of a legislative initiative on early restructuring and second chance. Finally, on 22 November 2016, the European Commission published its proposal for a European Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks and a second chance for entrepreneurs.

Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.

On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.

On October 4, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that chapter 7 debtors who file a statement of intention to surrender real property in bankruptcy cannot later contest a foreclosure action, and bankruptcy courts have broad power and authority to sanction violations. Failla v. CitiBank, N.A., case no. 15-15626 (11th Cir. October 4, 2016).

In Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC, Case No. 15-1945 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a 2-1 decision that filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), at least where state law preserves the right to collect on the payment. In so holding, the court sided with the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals in a circuit split regarding the viability of FDCPA claims premised on proofs of claim filed in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered a decision in the General Motors bankruptcy case that found an exception to the “free and clear” language of Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code2 where adequate notice of the sale order is not provided.3 However, the exception may not be far reaching due to the “peculiar” facts of the case.

Factual Background and Lower Court Decision

Learning the interplay between state rules of judicial procedure and federal bankruptcy law can be a daunting undertaking, but the pitfalls of failing to do so can be severe. A recent example of the importance of being mindful of these issues is Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. 2D15–1074, 2016 WL 3065014 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2016) where the filing of a bankruptcy petition ultimately cost a foreclosure defendant his right to appeal a final judgment of foreclosure.

The Second DCA summarized the procedural posture of the case as follows:

Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp.¹ that permitted the debtor, Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation (“Sabine”) to reject certain gathering and condensation agreements as executory contracts under 11 U.S.C. § 365. Because the midstream service sector finances the construction of pipelines, the costs of which are recovered over the life of gathering agreements, the Court’s decision has the potential to lead to considerable upheaval in the energy sector.

In March 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a landlord may be liable to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate for the value of a lease the debtor terminated early, holding the termination may be an “avoidable transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.¹ The opinion in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. T.D. Invs. I, LLP (In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP)² reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, and in doing so perhaps expanded the definition of a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.

Background