Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.

Poland's parliament recently adopted a new restructuring law (the “Bill”) which will substantially change the country’s economic environment.

After lengthy works, the draft of new restructuring law was finally adopted by the Polish parliament on 9 April 2015. The Bill now requires only the signature of the President.

The Bill provides for its entering into force on 1 June 2015, except for certain regulations that are to enter into force on 1 September 2015.

Current Polish bankruptcy and insolvency environment

Background

On 24 March 2015, the Bulgarian parliament promulgated an emergency insolvency law that makes almost all of the major effects of insolvency proceedings applicable to Corporate Commercial Bank, even as the court proceedings on the application for commencement of insolvency against the bank continue. In accordance with the new law, on 25 March 2015 the court appointed temporary insolvency administrators to that bank vested with broad powers to recover assets of the bank.

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.

Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a 
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is 
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
 Like many provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to 
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale. 

Who Will Think of the Tenants: Split in Authority Regarding the Interplay Between Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(A)

On 29 May 2014, the Moldovan Parliament passed the Act No. 90/2014 on amending and supplementing of certain legislative acts (Act No. 90). Act No.90, which entered into force on 27 June 2014, implements simplified rules on the liquidation of companies in Moldova (in particular, at the decision of their shareholders), namely by inter alia amending the Civil Code of Moldova, Act No. 845/1992 on Entrepreneurship and Enterprises, Act No. 220/2007 on State Registration of Companies and Individual Entrepreneurs.

The recent Eleventh Circuit case of In re Brown, 746 F.3d 1236 (2014) held that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)'s replacement value standard applies even when a Chapter 7 or 13 debtor surrenders collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in In re Brown has an important role in how personal property collateral will be valued in Chapter 7 and 13 cases in the Eleventh Circuit and thus its reasoning is important for creditors to understand.