With residential leasehold law in the spotlight, landlords should be aware of a recent court case which focused upon the method of calculating the premium payable for a residential lease extension.

On December 11, 2017, in a case entitled In re Iliceto, 1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision,2 which held that Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar" or the "Creditor") received notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise it that its status as a secured creditor was being challenged by Robert Iliceto ("Iliceto" or the "Debtor") in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding,3 even though the Debtor did not notify Nationstar that he was objecting to the validity of its mortgage.

Under § 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court shall not grant a debtor’s discharge if “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.” To prevail under § 727(a)(3) an objecting party must establish that the debtor has failed to maintain or preserve records.

The Eleventh Circuit has revisited the question of when a debtor may be judicially estopped from pursuing a civil lawsuit due to his or her failure to disclose the claims forming the basis of the lawsuit in their bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect courts against parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.

Last year, Burr & Forman lawyers won a decisive victory in the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of In re Failla, 838 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2016). In Failla, the Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor who files a statement of intention to “surrender” his or her house in bankruptcy may not oppose the secured creditor’s foreclosure proceeding in state court. Failla is a significant victory for secured creditors for two primary reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the meaning of “surrender,” as used in 11 U.S.C.

Signed, sealed, delivered, but am I yours? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at least in the context of allowed administrative expense claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The Third Circuit recently considered and ruled in a case as to when goods are deemed “received” for the purposes of determining whether a creditor may recover the value of the goods as an allowed administrative expense claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent case1 out of the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”), a secured creditor moved to dismiss a debtor’s bankruptcy case “for cause” based on the debtor’s bad faith filing.2 The debtor owned certain commercial real estate in south Florida (the “Commercial Property”) and leased space to various tenants, one of which had recently applied for both state and federal licenses to sell medical marijuana.3 The secured creditor had a first-position mortgage on the Commercial Property.4 After a decade-long lending relationship soured, the debtor initiated a len

What is a freezing order?

The purpose of a freezing order is to preserve the defendant's assets until judgment can be enforced. It operates by granting an injunction prohibiting the defendant (or anyone on his behalf) from disposing of identified assets. Legally, it does not operate as security over the assets.

Taylor v Van Dutch Marine Holding Ltd

A Court of Appeal judgment held that a company must have a settled intention to appoint an administrator when filing a notice of intent (NOI) under paragraph 26 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (“Schedule B1”) . The court also confirmed that an NOI cannot be filed in the absence of a qualifying floating charge holder (QFCH) on which to serve the notice.

In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Stephen G.