In Winnington Networks Communications Ltd v HMRC^[1], the Chancery Division Companies Court (Nicholas Le Poidevin QC) refused the taxpayer company's application to have HMRC's winding-up petitions dismissed, as it had failed to provide evidence that it had a real prospect of successfully disputing the debt claimed by HMRC.

Background

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

In Smailes and another v McNally and another^[i]the High Court refused the claimant's application for relief from sanctions, finding the claimant's failure in respect of its disclosure obligations under the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR 31) amounted to a significant and serious breach of an "unless order".

On 22 April 2015 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the case of Jetivia SA and another v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) and others [2015] UKSC 23, which was heard in October last year.  In short it decided that: 1) defendant directors cannot raise illegality as a defence to a claim by a company where the directors themselves acted wrongfully; and 2) a claim in fraudulent trading under Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Section 213)has extra-territorial effect.

Background

In SwissMarineCorporation Ltd v OW Supply & Trading[1], the High Court refused to grant an anti-suit injunction restraining Danish insolvency proceedings. This case provides a useful discussion of the circumstances in which the court are likely to grant an anti-suit injunction, and in particular where there are jurisdiction issues involving elements of both civil and insolvency proceedings.

In the recent case of HMRC v Munir & Others[1], HMRC successfully applied to the Court for committal of three company officers for contempt of court where an order appointing a provisional liquidator was knowingly breached.

 Background

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.

Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.

ADVISORY | DISPUTES | TRANSACTIONS Financial Litigation roundup Spring 2015 Welcome to the latest edition of our Financial Litigation roundup. In this edition, we consider recent judgments and ongoing cases from the banking and financial world in the UK and Asia, as well as regulatory developments across those jurisdictions. English judgments SPL Private Finance (PF1) IC Limited and others v Arch Financial Products LLP and others; SPL Private Finance (PF2) IC Ltd and other v Robin Farrell. more> McWilliam v Norton Finance (UK) Ltd (in liquidation).

Removal of requirement for sanction

Previously under section 165 IA 86, liquidators in a voluntary winding up would have to seek sanction of the company (in members’ voluntary liquidation) or of the court or liquidation committee (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) in order to exercise their powers to pay debts, compromise claims etc. SBEEA removes this requirement so that liquidators can exercise those powers freely. This will aid expeditious winding up of companies. Equivalent provisions have also been put into place for trustees in bankruptcy.