This Fall the Alberta Surface Rights Board (the “Board”) Panel issued its decision in Lemke v Petroglobe Inc, 2015 ABSRB 740. The Panel decided that it did not have authority to proceed with a claim by a landowner for unpaid compensation that had accrued before the date that the operator was assigned into bankruptcy.

On November 23, 2015, in the first appellate decision of its kind, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed a bankruptcy court order to compel chapter 7 debtors to surrender real property by directing the debtors to cease all foreclosure defense. The decision in Failla v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Failla), case no. 15-80328, marks the first decision from a federal appellate court to address the question of whether a bankruptcy court may enter an order directing a debtor to cease defending a mortgage foreclosure suit pending in state court.

Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.

In Jenkins v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,^[1]the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the filing of a proof of claim based on a time-barred debt cannot give rise to a claim for damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), reasoning that any such claim is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive claims-allowance procedure.

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

​Iona Contractors Ltd. v. Guarantee Company of North America

The Alberta Court of Appeal released its much anticipated decision addressing the interaction between the trust provisions of the Builders’ Lien Act (“BLA”) and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) in Iona Contractors Ltd. v Guarantee Company of North America, 2015 ABCA 240 on July 16, 2015.

The recent British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Yukon Zinc Corporation (Re), 2015 BCSC 836, provides some rare insight into the operation of provincial “miners lien” legislation in an insolvency context.

Background

The Alberta Energy Regulator’s (the “AER”) final phase of changes to the Licensee Liability Rating Program (the “LLR Program”) comes into effect on August 1, 2015. The AER’s Bulletin 2015-13 (found here) says that the implementation date was delayed from May 1 to August 1, 2015, to give licensees more time to understand the implications of, and prepare for, the Phase-3 program changes in light of current market conditions.

What is a Stalking Horse?

In the distressed M&A context, a stalking horse refers to a potential purchaser participating in a stalking horse auction who agrees to acquire the assets or business of an insolvent debtor as a going concern. In a stalking horse auction of an insolvent business, a preliminary bid by the stalking horse bidder is disclosed to the market and becomes the minimum bid, or floor price, that other parties can then outbid. 

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.