On November 23, 2015, in the first appellate decision of its kind, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed a bankruptcy court order to compel chapter 7 debtors to surrender real property by directing the debtors to cease all foreclosure defense. The decision in Failla v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Failla), case no. 15-80328, marks the first decision from a federal appellate court to address the question of whether a bankruptcy court may enter an order directing a debtor to cease defending a mortgage foreclosure suit pending in state court.
What do a car crash in Alberta, a delinquent farm mortgage in Saskatchewan and an unpaid highway toll ticket in Ontario have in common?
They all ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada.
35820 Alberta (Attorney General) v. Moloney
Constitutional law — Division of powers — Federal paramountcy — Bankruptcy and insolvency
Appeal from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (2014 ABCA 68), affirming a decision of Moen J. (2012 ABQB 644).
Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.
In Jenkins v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,[1]the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the filing of a proof of claim based on a time-barred debt cannot give rise to a claim for damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), reasoning that any such claim is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive claims-allowance procedure.
Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.
In Paul L. Schnier v. Her Majesty the Queen,[1] the Tax Court of Canada (TCC) dismissed a motion to quash an appeal brought on the basis that the appellant did not, as an undischarged bankrupt, have the capacity, pursuant to Section 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, to deal with property, including the ability to bring an appeal. The Appellant believed he was required to file the appeal, but did not obtain the trustee in bankruptcy’s permission when he commenced the appeal.
众所周知，采矿业面临着艰难的局面。在最近几年的市场繁荣时期，矿业公司承担了空前庞大的债务。目前，随着商品价格的下降和再融资来源的枯竭，这些巨额的债务令许多公司步履维艰，严重威胁着它们的生存。
加拿大
若无法与债权人商定业务解决方案，公司应该考虑向债权人寻求破产法项下的保护。在加拿大拥有资产或在加拿大经营业务且债务金额在五百万以上的公司可获得联邦《公司债权人安排法》（简称，“CCAA”）项下的保护。
CCAA允许公司在重组公司事务时暂缓债权人追诉，同时根据某些条件维持对公司经营的控制。公司，特别是未达到五百万债务门槛的公司，还可以考虑联邦《破产法》项下的和解机制。在本文中，我们将讨论CCAA项下的程序。
CCAA项下程序的第一步是获得法院命令，该命令将暂缓债权人在三十日的初始期限内行使其权利，从而允许公司制定重组方案。在获得首个暂缓命令前，公司无需通知债权人，尽管在许多情况下，建议公司通知其债权人。
若公司能够证明其很有可能将提交重组方案，并且延期不会有损于债权人的整体利益，暂缓命令的期限还可以延长。下达暂缓命令时，法院还将任命独立第三方在命令生效期间，监控公司业务及财务事宜。监控人须向法院报告公司的业务行为，但并不管理或指导公司业务。
On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.
Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.