Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

In determining the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an “objectively reasonable” standard, and held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, which had applied a subjective standard for civil contempt.

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

In an agricultural lien contest between three creditors of a bankrupt commercial farm, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of a bank that provided debtor-in-possession financing, holding that the locale of the farm products determined the applicable lien law and that bank’s lien was superior to the liens of two nurseries that supplied trees and shrubs because the latter were either unperfected or unenforceable.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a lower bankruptcy court’s ruling that a refinanced mortgage was enforceable as to the interests of both husband and wife, where the wife did not execute the note and was not defined as a “borrower” in the body of the mortgage, but nonetheless initialed and signed the mortgage document as a “borrower” in the signature block.

The Supreme Court of Missouri recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by certifying an overly broad class with a class representative whose claims against the debt collector defendant were not typical of the class.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a recent change to Ohio law involving notice of a defective lien had no bearing on a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to avoid the defective lien because such notice is irrelevant to a trustee’s status as a judicial lien creditor.

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s upholding of the bankruptcy court’s denial of the mortgagee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.