The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that the constructive notice provisions of section 1301.401 of the Ohio Revised Code do not limit a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

Reversing the rulings of both the appellate and the trial courts, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois recently held that the deadline to file a motion to quash service under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) did not run while the foreclosure action was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently reversed a trial court’s order denying two borrowers’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on judicial estoppel grounds.

In so ruling, the Fourth DCA held that the trial court improperly relied on a Fifth Circuit case and failed to apply Florida’s judicial estoppel doctrine when it concluded that the borrowers’ failure to disclose their attorney’s fee claim in their Chapter 11 bankruptcy schedules barred the fee claim.

Adding to the growing split of authority among California’s various state appellate courts, and among various federal courts in California, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, recently held that a loan servicer may owe a duty of care to a borrower through application of the “Biakanja” factors, even though its involvement in the loan does not exceed its conventional role.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity over claims which sought a temporary stay of a foreclosure sale pending the review of a loan modification application because the amount of controversy did not exceed $75,000.

In so ruling, the Court held that, for claims which merely seek a temporary stay of a foreclosure sale, the amount in controversy is not the value of the underlying loan.

A recent decision from a trial court sitting in Illinois calls into question whether debt collectors can rely on a widely used disclosure when collecting debt that may be subject to an expired limitations period.

A copy of the opinion in Richardson v. LVNV Funding, LLC is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that, following the confirmation of a foreclosure sale in Illinois, the only remedy available to a borrower under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 was damages, and therefore the one-year limitation period under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) applied and his claims were barred despite the fact that he provided rescission notices within three years of the loan closing, and despite the fact that the parties engaged in back-and-forth communications after the demands were first sent.

Following rulings from other appellate courts in other appellate districts, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal recently reversed a trial court’s order involuntarily dismissing a mortgagee’s foreclosure against a borrower holding that the mortgagee’s witness from its current mortgage servicer laid a sufficient foundation at trial to admit business records from a prior mortgage servicer necessary to prove a default under Florida’s business records exception to hearsay.