The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently reversed a trial court’s order denying two borrowers’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on judicial estoppel grounds.

In so ruling, the Fourth DCA held that the trial court improperly relied on a Fifth Circuit case and failed to apply Florida’s judicial estoppel doctrine when it concluded that the borrowers’ failure to disclose their attorney’s fee claim in their Chapter 11 bankruptcy schedules barred the fee claim.

Adding to the growing split of authority among California’s various state appellate courts, and among various federal courts in California, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, recently held that a loan servicer may owe a duty of care to a borrower through application of the “Biakanja” factors, even though its involvement in the loan does not exceed its conventional role.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction based upon diversity over claims which sought a temporary stay of a foreclosure sale pending the review of a loan modification application because the amount of controversy did not exceed $75,000.

In so ruling, the Court held that, for claims which merely seek a temporary stay of a foreclosure sale, the amount in controversy is not the value of the underlying loan.

On 15 December 2017, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court) delivered a landmark judgment in Macquarie Bank v. Shilpi Cables, Civil Appeal 15135/2017 on whether Section 9(3)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (Code) is mandatory and whether a demand notice of an unpaid operational debt can be issued by a lawyer on behalf of the operational creditor. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals of Macquarie Bank against the judgment of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (Appellate Tribunal) in Shilpi Cable Technologies v.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (NCLAT) on 7 November 2017 passed a judgment in the case of M/s Speculum Plast Private Limited v. PTC Techno Private Limited, putting to rest the question of the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) to the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The present judgment comes in the wake of the decision of the NCLAT in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd.

In a recent decision of M/s Ksheeraabd Constructions Private Limited v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) has held that proceedings pending under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) does not constitute a ‘dispute’ under Section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) and cannot come in the way of initiation of the insolvency resolution process, in terms of Section 9 of the Code.

Background

A recent decision from a trial court sitting in Illinois calls into question whether debt collectors can rely on a widely used disclosure when collecting debt that may be subject to an expired limitations period.

A copy of the opinion in Richardson v. LVNV Funding, LLC is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that, following the confirmation of a foreclosure sale in Illinois, the only remedy available to a borrower under 15 U.S.C. § 1635 was damages, and therefore the one-year limitation period under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) applied and his claims were barred despite the fact that he provided rescission notices within three years of the loan closing, and despite the fact that the parties engaged in back-and-forth communications after the demands were first sent.