The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a mortgage loan with a post-plan maturity date was not discharged in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because the plan did not “provide for” the debt and modify the repayment terms of the mortgage.

The Eleventh Circuit also held that the debt was not discharged because discharge would violate 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)’s anti-modification provision for mortgages secured by the debtor’s principal residence.

• A bankruptcy court in Ohio recently applied the incorrect statute of limitations in a mortgage foreclosure action.
• Ohio’s statute of limitations jurisprudence has evolved from an accepted legal proposition derived from one opinion to supposedly well-settled law stating the complete opposite in another opinion.
• Federal courts interpreting Ohio law must apply the correct statute of limitations to mortgage foreclosure actions.

In the bankruptcy case of In re Fisher, 584 B.R. 185, 199–200 (N.D. Ohio Bankr.

Pensions New (PN) has often had cause to ask himself what he knows.  A similar sort of question was frequently posed by the French essayist, Michel de Montaigne.  Montaigne lived between 1533 and 1592 and he answered this question over the course of a period of time during which he produced several volumes of great essays.  In those volumes, Montaigne covered many subjects however he never covered the subject of the occupational defined benefit pension scheme.  So far PN knows, this is the first article ever written about Montaigne’s relationshi

On 31 October 2018 the Supreme Court issued its Judgment in the appeal of Dooneen Ltd (t/a McGinness Associates) and another (Respondents) v Mond (Appellant) (Scotland) [2018] UKSC 54.

The appeal had been brought by Mr Mond who had sought to overturn the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session (Dooneen Ltd & Others V Mond [2016] CSIH 59).

Factual background

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently rejected an attempt by homeowners to collaterally attack a state court mortgage foreclosure judgment, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but on alternative grounds.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit the lender’s right to foreclose under the terms of the valid reverse mortgage contract where the non-borrower spouse was still living in the home.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition for injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure sale.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s foreclosure action did not violate an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules, where the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose his recent acquisition of the subject property from his son.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mortgagee because father and son plaintiffs were judicially estopped from claiming a stay violation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently applied the “conceivable effect” test in holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over a state law fraud claim raised by a third party regarding the validity of a lender’s lien, and therefore, declined to consider the issue on appeal.

In so ruling, the Panel ruled that the state law fraud claim did not invoke “arising under” or “arising in” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because the state law fraud claim was not created or determined by the Bankruptcy Code, and could exist outside of bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that a borrower is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Law (“Act 6”) relating to an affirmative defense raised in a mortgage foreclosure action that was subsequently discontinued without prejudice.