The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently rejected an attempt by homeowners to collaterally attack a state court mortgage foreclosure judgment, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of an amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, but on alternative grounds.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20(j) did not alter or limit the lender’s right to foreclose under the terms of the valid reverse mortgage contract where the non-borrower spouse was still living in the home.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition for injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure sale.

From time to time the statutory rights available to parties to construction contracts appears to come into conflict with other sets of provisions that also claim to govern the same areas of dispute. Perhaps the best known such clash, between adjudication and the effect of insolvency, was that explored in the Scottish case of Melville Dundas Limited (in Receivership) v George Wimpey UK Limited[1] in 2007.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s foreclosure action did not violate an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules, where the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose his recent acquisition of the subject property from his son.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mortgagee because father and son plaintiffs were judicially estopped from claiming a stay violation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently applied the “conceivable effect” test in holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over a state law fraud claim raised by a third party regarding the validity of a lender’s lien, and therefore, declined to consider the issue on appeal.

In so ruling, the Panel ruled that the state law fraud claim did not invoke “arising under” or “arising in” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because the state law fraud claim was not created or determined by the Bankruptcy Code, and could exist outside of bankruptcy.

On 17 December 2015, the Ministry of Justice made a final decision to end the Insolvency Litigation exemption from the 2012 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LAPSO) (see

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that a borrower is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Law (“Act 6”) relating to an affirmative defense raised in a mortgage foreclosure action that was subsequently discontinued without prejudice.

In May 2018, Mothercare and Carluccio's became the latest in an increasingly long line of high street names to propose Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) involving significant site closures and rent reductions. On 31 May, 91% of unsecured creditors approved the Carluccio's CVA, and the following day Mothercare's creditors followed suit (although that was not the case with all of its subsidiaries, as discussed below). Next in line according to recent reports are House of Fraser and then Homebase, following the latter's acquisition for £1 by retail restructuring specialists Hilco.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that claim preclusion does not bar a mortgagee from proceeding with a foreclosure complaint despite a prior litigation which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice if the subsequent litigation is based upon a default and acceleration which occurred after the initial foreclosure proceeding.