The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a condominium association acting on its six-month super-priority lien for unpaid condominium assessments pursuant to § 42-1903.13(a)(2) of the District of Columbia Condominium Act (the “D.C. Condo Act”) may not conduct its foreclosure sale subject to a first deed of trust lien, even if the terms of sale stated that the condo unit would be sold subject to first deed of trust.

In an action against a Florida consumer plaintiffs’ firm that also functions as consumer bankruptcy debtors’ counsel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy attorney violates section 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code if he instructs a client to pay his legal fees using a credit card.

In so ruling, the Court held that there is no requirement under the statute that the advice be given for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process.

The Supreme Court of Florida recently denied a pro se borrower’s petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, and imposed sanctions against him for filing numerous meritless and inappropriate petitions for relief pertaining to trial court foreclosure proceedings to which he is a defendant.

In so doing, the Supreme Court barred the borrower from filing any future pleadings, motions or requests for relief in the Supreme Court related to his foreclosure proceedings, unless filed in good faith by an attorney in good standing.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a completely unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) even though a proof of claim has not been filed.

A copy of the opinion in Edwin Burkhart v. Nancy Spencer Grigsby is available at: Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that the constructive notice provisions of section 1301.401 of the Ohio Revised Code do not limit a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

Reversing the rulings of both the appellate and the trial courts, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois recently held that the deadline to file a motion to quash service under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) did not run while the foreclosure action was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

Encrypted digital currencies (“cryptocurrencies”),1 particularly Bitcoin, have recently become the target of enormous international speculation and market scrutiny. Some expect cryptocurrency payments and other transactions tracked via distributed ledger technology (“DLT”, of which “blockchain” technology is one example) to be the future of commercial interaction. The theory is that cryptocurrencies could become “the holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries.”2

An equipment finance company finances the purchase of a truck and registers a purchase-money security interest (a “PMSI”) pursuant to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) to protect its interest. The truck breaks down and is taken in for repairs. While the truck is in the shop, the debtor defaults under its lending arrangements with the equipment finance company.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

In a January 31, 2018 decision from the bench in the matter of Royal Bank of Canada v. A-1 Asphalt Maintenance Ltd. (Court File No. CV-14-10784-00CL) (“A-1 Asphalt”), Madam Justice Conway of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) held that the deemed trust provisions of subsection 8(1)(a) of the Construction Lien Act (Ontario) (the “CLA”) were not, on their own, sufficient to create a trust recognized in a contractor’s bankruptcy or proposal proceedings.