The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently rejected a bankruptcy trustee’s effort to avoid a mortgage on the basis that the acknowledgment signed by the borrowers’ attorney-in-fact was defective under Massachusetts law, holding that the acknowledgment was not materially defective because as a matter of agency law the attorney-in-fact’s signature was the borrowers’ “free act and deed.”

Just about every year changes are made to the rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed — the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The revisions address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others.

The In re Tempnology LLC bankruptcy case in New Hampshire has produced yet another important decision involving trademarks and Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code. This time the decision is from the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (“BAP”). Although the BAP’s Section 365(n) discussion is interesting, even more significant is its holding on the impact of rejection of a trademark license.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that if a creditor wishes to participate in the distribution of a debtor’s assets under Chapter 13, it must timely file a proof of claim, and the debtor’s acknowledgment of the debt owed to the creditor does not relieve the creditor of this affirmative duty.

A copy of the opinion is available at: Link to Opinion.

Before a bankruptcy court may confirm a chapter 11 plan, it must determine if any of the persons voting to accept the plan are “insiders,”i.e., individuals or entities with a close relationship to the debtor. Because the Bankruptcy Code’s drafters believed that insider transactions warrant heightened scrutiny the classification of a creditor as an “insider” can have a profound impact on a debtor’s ability to reorganize.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.

The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that a secured party’s foreclosure did not discharge an otherwise valid security interest in the proceeds of the collateral, nor did it preclude the creditor from pursuing its rights to such proceeds.

The Supreme Court of the United States has decided it will review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. Midland Funding LLC.

A link to the docket is available here: Link to Docket.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the word “surrender” in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2), requires that debtors relinquish all of their rights to the collateral.

In so ruling, the Court ordered the borrowers to “surrender” their house to the mortgagee in a foreclosure action, and held that the bankruptcy court had the authority to compel the borrowers to fulfill their mandatory duty under 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) not to oppose a foreclosure action in state court.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case of first impression and the first published circuit court opinion to address the issue, recently held that each and every debt collector — not just the first one to communicate with a debtor — must send the debt validation notice required by the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.