With the rampant spread of COVID-19 worldwide, there are increasing concerns as to the financial impact of the outbreak. With forced business closures a potential reality, it seems inevitable that the Australian economy is on its way to a recession.

It is therefore critical that directors of companies are fully aware of the extent of their duties and understand what they must do to comply.

On 4 February 2020, the Federal Court of Australia considered the circumstances in which it might be said that a provisional liquidator of a company ought not be appointed as the official liquidator because of an alleged "reasonable apprehension of bias". The issue was ventilated before the Court in the matter of  Frisken (as receiver of Avant Garde Investments Pty Ltd v Cheema [2020] FCA 98.

Appointing a provisional liquidator

Entering into liquidation can be a scary time for any company and its officers, even one which chooses to do so voluntarily. However, the directors, shareholders and creditors of a company entering into liquidation do not have absolute discretion as to who they may appoint as the liquidator of the company. Together, the Corporations Act and common law principles of independence regulate the eligibility of a liquidator to be appointed to a company, and to remain in the appointment.

Overarching eligibility

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a recent decision, In re Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., No. 14-000255-mdc (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that state sovereign immunity does not prevent bankruptcy courts from hearing fraudulent transfer claims against states.

On January 13, 2020, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion in In re La Paloma Generating Company, LLC., Case No. 16-12700 [Adv. Pro.

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an issue that has greatly divided Circuit Courts of Appeal – the question of whether an entity that retains possession of a debtor’s property has an affirmative obligation to return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition or risk being in violation of the automatic stay.

The Supreme Court, in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,¹ issued an unanimous opinion last week, ruling that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly denied the ability of creditor Ritzen Group Inc.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court case that held that the mutuality requirement of section 553(a)¹The case declined to find mutuality in a triangular setoff between the debtor, a parent entity that owed the debtor money, and that entity’s subsidiary, which was a creditor.²

A recent bankruptcy court decision out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, In re Verity Health Sys. of Cal., Inc., Case No. 2:18-bk-20151 (ER) (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019), is a good reminder of how difficult it is for a purchaser under an asset purchase agreement to get out of the deal by invoking a Material Adverse Effect clause (also known as a Material Adverse Change clause) (an “MAE”).