The issue of whether directors, officers, and/or shareholders breached their fiduciary duties to a company prior to bankruptcy is commonly litigated in chapter 11 cases, as creditors look to additional sources for recovery, such as D&O insurance or “deep-pocket” shareholders, including private equity firms. The recent decision in In re AMC Investors, LLC, 637 B.R. 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022) provides a helpful reminder of the importance of timing in bringing such claims and the use by defendants of affirmative defenses to defeat those claims.
Courts Begin to Wrestle with the Impact of on a Debtor’s Ability to Recover Estate Property
Late last week, the District Court for the Southern District of New York provided a reminder of the importance of precise drafting. In Transform Holdco LLC v. Sears Holdings Corp. et. al., CV-05782, Doc. 20, the contractual question at issue related to the purchase of substantially all of the assets (and assumption of certain of the liabilities) of Sears and its domestic and foreign subsidiaries by Transform Holdco LLC (“Transform”) in Sears’ bankruptcy case.
In a 2021 chapter 15 decision, In re Bankruptcy Estate of Norske Skogindustrier ASA,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that foreign law avoidance claims that are sufficiently analogous to claims under section 548(a)(1)(A)2 of the Bankruptcy Code—but not identical—may fall within the intentional fraud exception to the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e)3 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Safe Harbor”).
The COVID-19 pandemic hit the bottom line of many businesses. Among the hardest hit industries has been the travel industry and, in particular, airlines and aviation companies. Many airlines are still struggling to generate new ticket sales as compared to pre-pandemic levels and average fares remain depressed.1 One industry source predicts that passenger numbers will not return to 2019 levels prior to 2024.2 Compounding this are increased costs of fuel (up 35% so far this year) and other expenses.3
The COVID-19 pandemic hit the bottom line of many businesses. Among the hardest hit industries has been the travel industry and, in particular, airlines and aviation companies. Many airlines are still struggling to generate new ticket sales as compared to pre-pandemic levels and average fares remain depressed.1 One industry source predicts that passenger numbers will not return to 2019 levels prior to 2024.2 Compounding this are increased costs of fuel (up 35% so far this year) and other expenses.3
The financing of commercial litigation has grown enormously since it first appeared on the scene in the US, about 15 years ago. While still small relative to the overall US financial market, it is estimated that more than $11 billion has been invested in litigation finance in the US last year alone. In essence, lenders (often referred to as “funders”) provide commercial claimants and contingency law firms with the capital needed to prosecute legal claims which the funders believe have a strong likelihood of success.
Backstop commitments have become commonplace in large corporate bankruptcy cases – they provide certainty to the debtor that it will have the funds needed to satisfy its obligations to creditors under its plan of reorganization and that it will have liquidity to operate post-bankruptcy as the reorganized entity. Backstop commitments are also a way for certain creditors to generate some additional return in the form of commitment fees and expense reimbursements in exchange for their agreement to backstop all or a material portion of a proposed rights offering or other financing arrangement.
Despite recent criticisms of venue selection and cries to limit or curtail various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York demonstrates that the bankruptcy courts may continue to broadly interpret the scope of their jurisdictional reach and the powers and authorities granted to them under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re JPA No. 111 Co., Ltd., No. 21-12075 (DSJ) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.