The United States Supreme Court recently declined to review the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s opinion in Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA. BOKF and Wilmington Trust, indenture trustees for Momentive’s First Lien Notes and 1.5 Lien Notes (which we’ll refer to as the “Senior Notes”) respectively, each submitted certiorari petitions after the Second Circuit held that they were not entitled to receive make-whole premiums following Momentive’s bankruptcy.

What Is a Make-Whole?

In the recent decision William R. Lee Irrevocable Trust v. Lee (In re Lee), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision (also affirmed by the district court) piercing a non-debtor’s corporate veil and allowing a creditor of the non-debtor to participate in the bankruptcy of the corporation’s individual shareholder.

Over the last two years, BEIS has issued a number of consultations either focussed on, or touching upon, corporate governance issues in insolvency or the broader insolvency framework.

In the novel A Frolic of His Own, by William Gaddis1, the protagonist, Oscar Crease, is run over by his own driverless car when it slips from park into neutral while Oscar is standing in front of the car trying to hot-wire it.

Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code grants secured creditors the right to credit bid up to the full amount of their claim as a form of currency to bid to purchase assets securing their claim from a debtor in connection with a stand-alone sale of assets under section 363(b). In a recent opinion from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Aerogroup International, Inc., Judge Kevin J.

On various occasions during the periods 2012 to 2018, Shane Warner Builders Limited (SWBL) regularly failed to pay GST and PAYE to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.

In January 2018 the Commissioner filed an application to put SWBL into liquidation.  The proceeding was adjourned in March 2018 whilst the Commissioner and Applicant engaged in negotiations for relief which ultimately failed due to SWBL's history of failures to pay tax arrears and failing to provide substantive supporting evidence regarding the source of funds required to settle current tax arrears. 

North Harbour Motors Limited (in liquidation) (North Harbour) issued a statutory demand against Moffat Road Limited (Moffat) in respect of two separate $30,000 deposits paid by North Harbour to Moffat on the purchase of two properties pursuant to agreements for sale and purchase dated 6 July 2015 (the Agreements).

FTG Securities Limited involved an application by FTG Securities Limited (FTG) for declarations as to the interpretation of a Deed of Priority.  The Deed of Priority was entered into by Canterbury Finance Limited (CFL) and a bank with respect to the security interests in Tuam Ventures Limited (in Rec and in Liq) (TVL).  Declaratory relief was sought against the bank and the receivers of TVL.  An issue raised by way of an affirmative defence was whether the assignment of TVL's debt and securities to FTG is valid from a technical legal perspective and therefore wh

In what is likely to be the final chapter in the Ross Asset Management (RAM) liquidation, assuming no appeal is filed, the High Court has considered an application for directions by the liquidators of Ross Asset Management concerning how best to distribute recovered funds.  David Ross operated RAM as a Ponzi scheme for decades until the fraud was uncovered in 2012 and the company went into liquidation.  Mr Ross is currently serving a ten year plus term of imprisonment for his role as architect of the scheme.

In Lafferty v Official Assignee Gordon J considered Mr Lafferty's appeal of two decisions of the Official Assignee to refuse Mr Lafferty's applications under section 62(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 to enter or carry on business while bankrupt.

Gordon J dismissed the appeal on the basis that Mr Lafferty could not show that the Official Assignee had made an error of law, failed to take into account relevant considerations or was manifestly wrong in exercising its discretion under regulation 34 of the Insolvency Regulations 1970.