On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code

Major legislative changes

Reform of English corporate insolvency framework

The Insolvency Service is reviewing responses to its consultation on significant reforms designed to improve the restructuring tools available to companies. These include:

Since Marblegate was decided in 2014, the only court to address claims under §316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) in the context of a corporate restructuring transaction is

Section 1104(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee “if such appointment is in the interests of the creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate . . . .” While it is not often that we see a court displace management pursuant to section 1104(a)(2), it does happen on occasion. One such recent case is In re China Fishery Group Limited. Case No. 16-11895 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28. 2016), where Judge James L. Garrity, Jr.

In early November, the Ninth Circuit held in In re New Investments, Inc. that a debtor was required to “cure” defaults to an agreement using a post-default interest rate, overturning its prior, decades-old decision In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., which had held that a debtor could cure agreements at pre-default interest rates.

Background

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission announced a draft directive on insolvency, restructuring and second chance in the EU in the form of the EU Business Restructuring Directive (the “Proposed Directive“) which can be read here.

The Bankruptcy Code gives a trustee the power to avoid pre-petition fraudulent and preference transfers made by a debtor, except that a trustee may not avoid a transfer that is "made by or to (or for the benefit of)" a party enumerated in 546(e) of the Code "in connection with a securities contract." Although 546(e) has been applied in various circumstances, there is little court guidance on whether 546(e) protects transfers made to repay commercial mortgage-backed securities ("CMBS") loans. One case in particular has applied 546(e) to dismiss such an avoidance action: Krol v.

Hoku, a publicly-owned Delaware corporation, filed for bankruptcy with just $8 million in assets compared to a relatively staggering $1.3 billion in liabilities, much of which was funded debt. In light of this significant insolvency, Hoku’s chapter 7 trustee brought various breach of fiduciary claims against Hoku’s board of directors, including one akin to a claim for “deepening insolvency.” As the case of Hopkins v.

Burr & Forman lawyers won a significant victory in the Eleventh Circuit earlier this month. In the case In re: David A. Failla, — F.3d — (2016), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that a person who agrees to “surrender” his house in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) may not oppose the creditor’s foreclosure action in state court. Our firm was one of the first to advance this argument, and many, but not all, of the bankruptcy judges in Florida agreed with our interpretation of surrender under the bankruptcy code and related case law.

On October 11, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States granted cert in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348 (Oct. Term 2016) to resolve a split among the Circuits as to the FDCPA’s prohibition against deceptive collection practices in the context of filing proofs of claim for debts where a collection action would otherwise be time-barred.