Fulltext Search

In Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1802), the Fourth Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling protecting licensees’ rights in connection with the recognition of a German insolvency proceeding.  In Jaffe, the foreign debtor’s administrator petitioned the U.S. bankruptcy court for powers under Chapter 15 of the U.S.

In In re Eastman Kodak Co., 495 B.R. 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-10202), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York permitted a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (Kodak) to assign a previously assumed real estate lease despite the lease’s anti-assignment clause.

On November 12, 2013, the Alberta government issued EPPA Update 13-01, in response to recent developments in the actuarial profession affecting defined benefit pension (DB) plans.

In SimpleAir, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11-cv-416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2013), the court held that the attorney-client privilege associated with certain patents travelled with the patents where the patents were the majority of the assets owned by each transferor.

In In re Village at Lakeridge, LLC, BAP Nos. 12-1456, 12-1474 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2013), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit clarified that, in order to apply the common interest doctrine, a trial court must make a finding that the parties expressly or implicitly agreed to participate in a joint legal strategy. In this case, secured creditor, US Bank, deposed the sole unsecured creditor, Rabkin.

In Wallis v. Centennial Insurance Co., No. 08-cv-2558 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2013), Magistrate Judge Allison Claire of the Eastern District of California held that the New York Superintendent of Insurance had the authority to assert the attorney-client privilege on behalf of an insurer that was in the process of being liquidated by the Superintendent.

In In re Cardinal Fastener & Specialty Co., No. 11-15719 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2013), the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that a law firm hired to represent the debtor could not assert privilege on behalf of the debtor’s individual directors and officers.