The Act of Parliament that implemented the 2019 federal budget also included significant changes to Canada's principal corporate and restructuring statutes. These included changes to the Canada Business Corporations Act ("CBCA"), the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act ("BIA") and the Companies Creditors' Arrangements Act ("CCAA").1 One of the reasons for the changes is to make insolvency proceedings more fair, transparent and accessible for workers and pensioners.2 The changes are now in effect and will have a significant impact on Canadian insolvency law and practice.

In a recent split decision, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that super-priority charges granted in a Companies’ Creditor Arrangement Act (“CCAA”) proceeding may take priority over statutory deemed trusts claims advanced by the Crown.

A Manitoba Court recently offered guidance on how to approach an appeal from a notice of disallowance or determination of a claim under section 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 ("BIA"). Existing jurisprudence provided conflicting positions on whether to treat such appeals as true appeals or a hearing de novo. True appeals generally restrict the evidentiary record before the court to the evidence that was before the trustee. In a de novo hearing, the appeal court considers fresh evidence as a matter of course.

A Manitoba Court recently offered guidance on how to approach an appeal from a notice of disallowance or determination of a claim under section 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3 (“BIA”). Existing jurisprudence provided conflicting positions on whether to treat such appeals as true appeals or a hearing de novo. True appeals generally restrict the evidentiary record before the court to the evidence that was before the trustee. In a de novo hearing, the appeal court considers fresh evidence as a matter of course.

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

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