Sometimes different bits of legislation are, on the face of it, in conflict with each other. This is specially so when new law is introduced. The impact of new law on old law sets up contradictions, which the courts have to sort out. An interesting recent example arose in the context of business rescue.
The issue in this case was whether a payment of R389 593.49 by Ditona – a company being wound-up – to another company Eravin, was recoverable by Ditona’s liquidators as a void disposition or unrecoverable because, it was a pre-business rescue debt, which may not be enforced.
On 21 September 2016, the Western Cape High Court (Court) handed down judgement in the case of Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others (Rogers J) [2016] ZAWCHC 124 in terms of which the Court considered, among other questions, the following:
In the recent unreported decision of Alberta Treasury Branches v. Northpine Energy Ltd., the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta authorized a disposition of a debtor’s assets by a receiver immediately upon appointment and without being forced to conduct a marketing process within the receivership proceedings.
On April 14, 2016, the priority of statutory trust protections afforded to subcontractors and suppliers under Alberta’s lien legislation was strengthened: the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal in Iona Contractors Ltd. v. Guarantee Company of North America, 2015 ABCA 240, thereby bolstering the priority of the trust even in the face of a bankrupt general contractor.
It is now generally accepted that the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) is an overhaul of our corporate law landscape. This shift is even more evident with the introduction of a new business rescue regime and along with it, the general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.
Section 133 of the Act provides that no legal proceedings including enforcement action may commence or continue against a company undergoing business rescue, save where amongst other exceptions, consent is granted by the court or obtained from the business rescue practitioner.
Both the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”)[1] and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act[2] stay actions and remedies as against debtors.
Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.
The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.
Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.
Section 11.4 of the CCAA requires that persons identified as critical suppliers to a debtor company continue to provide goods and services on terms and conditions with the existing supply relationship.
In Hattingh v Roux NO & Others 2011 (3) SA 135 (WCC), the plaintiff, Hattingh, sought to show that the defendant, Roux junior, intentionally and unlawfully injured Hattingh by executing an illegal and highly dangerous manoeuvre during a scrum in an Under 19 rugby match between two Western Cape high school teams.
Among other issues considered by the court was the delictual ground of intent: whether Roux junior, if he had in fact executed the manoeuvre which injured Hattingh, acted negligently or intentionally in doing so.
The case of Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café CC trading as Newscafé Bedfordview case number 2016/11853 GLDJ reiterated the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decision in Cloete Murray NO & another v Firstrand Bank Ltd T/A Wesbank 2015 (3) SA 438 (SCA) that an agreement can be cancelled during business rescue as the unilateral act of cancellation does not constitute enforcement action in terms of s133(1) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 ( Act).