In Roering & Another NNO v Mahlangu (581/2015) [2016] ZASCA 79 heard recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered the circumstances that might justify a witness under subpoena applying for enquiry proceedings to be set aside or for the witness to be excused from attending those proceedings.

The general rule is that a subpoenaed witness is compelled to attend, subject to procedural requirements being met, and the evidence sought being relevant to the insolvent company or entity.

Court appointed receivers commonly assume control over all of a debtor’s property. In assuming that control, the receiver may collect various pieces of the debtor’s leased equipment, and include that equipment in a sale of the debtor’s assets. Further, the court order appointing the receiver will typically grant the receiver a priority charge over all such equipment for its fees, including the fees of its counsel, and any borrowings it may make in the course of the receivership.

In the recent case of Constantia Insurance Company Limited v Master of the High Court, Johannesburg (23968/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 121 the High Court considered whether the provisions of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act) permit the Master to consider liquidators’ additional submissions in response to a creditor’s substantiation of its claim.

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Swart v Starbuck & Others 2016 ZASCA 83, reaffirmed the necessary authorisation for a trustee of an insolvent estate to sell an insolvent estate’s immovable property.

Mr Swart’s estate was finally sequestrated on 1 November 2005. On 24 January 2006, three provisional trustees were appointed by the Master of the High Court. At the time of Mr Swart’s provisional sequestration, he owned certain immovable properties (Properties).

One of the most vexing commercial insolvency issues is the competition between creditors with security on environmentally troubled property and environmental authorities looking for deep pockets to fix the environmental problems. From a creditor’s point of view, a recent Alberta decision is a potential respite from environmental obligations being imposed on creditors of the owners of environmentally troubled property.

Facility agreements ordinarily oblige a borrower to prepay the facility on the occurrence of certain events, including, if a borrower receives insurance proceeds or asset sale proceeds during the loan term. The rationale for this is that lenders wish to use this unexpected windfall to mitigate the risk of non-payment. This is also the approach of the Loan Market Association (LMA) in its standard facility agreements.

Employment contracts were previously deemed to be suspended on the date of liquidation, being the date that the application for liquidation of the company is presented and issued at court in terms of s348 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Companies Act). However, this position has since changed.

Section 133 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 places a general moratorium on legal proceedings, while the company is under business rescue. This provides a company with time and resources to be rehabilitated through the implementation of a business rescue plan. As a result, there is some debate as to whether creditors are precluded from perfecting their security, such as a notarial bond, under business rescue.

There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.

The ‘dual jurisdiction’ regime has long been entrenched in South Africa’s corporate insolvency law. This principal arises from the provisions of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Act), which provides that jurisdiction over a company is determined by the location of both its registered address and its principal place of business with the creditor having the choice of jurisdiction.

With the enactment of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (New Act), the question that then follows is: Does this principle of jurisdiction continue to apply under the New Act?