On March 10, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a Memorandum Order, in which it affirmed a controversial bankruptcy court ruling. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court that Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., an upstream oil and gas producer, could reject a number of its gathering contracts with midstream energy companies.

In a March 8, 2016 ruling from the bench, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a significant decision regarding the ability of a debtor in bankruptcy to reject gas gathering agreements and similar intrastate contracts. Judge Shelley Chapman, overseeing the bankruptcy case of In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., determined that those agreements could be rejected in bankruptcy, notwithstanding contractual provisions that purport to issue conveyances that run with the land.

Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,¹ wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.

Background

In Aventura², a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.

On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,^[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.

On September 8, 2015, a federal district court invalidated a portion of the Georgia post-judgment garnishment statute in Strickland v. Alexander, No. 1:12-CV-02735-MHS (N.D. Ga.). Senior Judge Marvin Shoob found that the statute was constitutionally deficient on due process grounds, insofar as it fails to require:

Introduction

On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.

On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons¹ to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.

Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts.