On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
Secured creditors should take note of Callidus,1 wherein the Federal Court (the “Court”) held that the bankruptcy of a tax debtor rendered a statutory deemed trust under section 222 of the Excise Tax Act (the “ETA”) ineffective as against a secured creditor who, prior to the bankruptcy, received proceeds from the tax debtor’s assets.
Background
In Aventura2, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.
In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin (Oct. 20, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery, in a post-trial decision, rejected Quadrant’s challenges to transactions by Athilon Capital Corp., with Athilon’s sole stockholder (private equity firm Merced), after Athilon had returned to solvency following a long period of insolvency. Merced held all of Athilon’s equity and all of its junior notes; and both Quadrant and Merced held the company’s publicly traded senior notes.
On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.
On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.
To Our Clients and Friends Memorandum friedfrank.com Copyright © 2015 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 06/04/15 A Delaware Limited Liability Partnership 1 The Supreme Court Rules That Bankruptcy Judges May Adjudicate Stern Claims with the Parties’ Knowing and Voluntary Consent On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network v.
On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissing the appeal of chapter 13 debtor Luis Bullard for lack of jurisdiction.1 The Court held that the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying confirmation of Bullard’s proposed chapter 13 plan was not a final order from which Bullard could immediately appeal as of right.2 The Court reasoned that, while confirmation of a plan can be said to fix the rights and obligations of the parties in a way that alters the status quo, d
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.