11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) provides (emphasis added):

• “(c) . . . the condition that a plan be fair and equitable . . . includes . . . (2) . . . all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, . . . will be applied to make payments under the plan.”

There is little-to-no guidance in the Bankruptcy Code on what “as the court may fix” might mean. So, that meaning is left to the courts to decide.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), an individual debtor may be denied a discharge, in its entirely, for making a transfer “with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or the trustee.

On April 17, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for Eastern Michigan ruled:

A “silent” creditor in Subchapter V is one who does not vote on the debtor’s plan and does not object to that plan. The “silent” creditor is a problem for Subchapter V cases.

The Problem

Here’s the problem:

Here are a couple discharge-related bankruptcy questions I’ve heard of late, along with an answer.

Question 1. Why are individuals, but not corporations, eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge?

• §727(a)(1) says, “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—(1) the debtor is not an individual” (emphasis added).

Question 2. Why are individuals, but not corporations, subject to § 523(a) discharge exceptions in Chapter 11?

In a groundbreaking ruling, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia recently delivered a decision that is poised to significantly influence insolvency proceedings. The case, cited as British Columbia v. Peakhill Capital Inc., 2024 BCCA 246, marks the first time an appellate court has addressed the jurisdiction and appropriateness of reverse vesting orders (RVOs) in receivership contexts. This ruling provides crucial insights into the court's reasoning and its implications for legal and non-legal professionals alike.

Background and core issue

Can non-compete and confidentiality protections in a rejected franchise agreement be discharged in bankruptcy?

The answer is, “No,” according to In re Empower Central Michigan, Inc.[Fn. 1]

Facts

Debtor is an automotive repair shop.

Debtor operates under a Franchise Agreement with Autolab Franchising, LLC. The Franchise Agreement has a non-compete provision, and there is a separate-but-related confidentiality agreement.

The continuing effort in Congress to extend Subchapter V’s $7.5 million debt limit recently hit a snag. The result: the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility expired on June 21, 2024, and the Subchapter V debt limit is now reduced to an inflation-adjusted $3,024,725.[i]

A public and competitive process

2023 closed with a significant rise in the number of insolvencies in France. With a total of 56,200 insolvency proceedings (redressement judiciaire and liquidation judiciaire), mainly in the retail sector, the opportunities for taking over a business at the bar of a court are multiplying.

However, these takeovers are governed by a strict timetable and formalities, requiring a thorough understanding of the workings of insolvency law.

The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:

• abusive behavior;
• bad faith conduct;
• a means for swindling creditors;
• the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
• a tool for avoiding liability;
• etc., etc.

Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”

Here’s a dilemma:

• Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?

Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:

• many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
• many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.

How do we solve this dilemma?