Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) litigations have sometimes yield "shocking results". There is no pun intended here. This article discusses a recent case where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana waded into the spine tingling issue of whether electricity is a good that is subject to Section 503(b)(9) administrative priority status.

Large businesses and organizations that self-insure their legally mandated insurance requirements often use “fronting” policies in which the policyholder must reimburse insurers for all losses and expenses paid on the policyholder’s behalf. These policyholders must furnish substantial collateral to secure repayment, typically, enough to pay many years’ worth of actual and anticipated claims. This can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, and typically exacerbates cash flow and balance sheet problems for policyholders under financial stress.

On February 1, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) released its long-awaited decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers. By a five to two majority, the SCC allowed the appeal from the 2011 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) which had created so much uncertainty about the priority of pension claims in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings.

In October 2012, The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. (“Futura”) commenced proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). On November 13, 2012, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) considered Futura’s request to permit pre-filing, prepayment obligations to its key customers.

On January 27, 2012, Justice Newbould of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) released his decision in Temple (Re),1 holding that the Ontario Limitations Act, 20022 (the “Act”) does not apply to a bankruptcy application and does not operate to extinguish a debt owing to a creditor.

The Ontario Limitations Act, 2002

Introduction

Does the dissolution of a corporation that is in receivership terminate the receivership? Until the recent decision of Meta Energy Inc. v. Algatec Solarwerke Brandenberg GMBH, 2012 ONSC 175, 2012 ONSC 4873, there was no previous court decision directly on point. The answer to the question is “no.”

Background

A recent case illustrates the importance of clarity in the contractual arrangements associated with the disposition of a debtor’s assets. In the case, the Court appointed receiver was given Court approval for an auction services agreement. Under that agreement, the auctioneer was to conduct an auction sale of the debtor’s assets and was entitled to charge and collect a buyer’s premium equal to a minimum of 12% of the sales price.

In two recent decisions,² the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions by large chapter 11 debtors to approve executive bonus plans designated as key employee incentive plans ("KEIP"), finding that the proposed KEIPs actually were disguised and impermissible retention or "pay to stay" bonus plans for insiders. These are the first opinions to reject so-called KEIPs following a recent line of cases that have approved KEIPs for insiders.

On July 2, 2012, the Illinois Department of Insurance (IDOI) entered an Agreed Order of Rehabilitation against Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company and American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, which is the part of the Lumbermens Mutual Group formerly known as Kemper (collectively, “Lumbermens”). Under the order, IDOI’s Director will serve as Lumbermens’ Rehabilitator with powers to restructure Lumbermens’ insurance business. From this point forward, Lumbermens will no longer take on any new insurance obligations, issue any new policies, or renew any existing policies.

In a recent decision¹ involving Global Aviation Holdings, Inc.