InIn re Juarez, 603 B.R. 610 (9th Cir. BAP 2019), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit with respect to property that is exempt from creditor reach: it adopted the view that, under the "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule," an individual Chapter 11 debtor intending to retain such property need not make a "new value" contribution covering the value of the exemption.
Background
The new Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill will introduce new provisions to protect a company from suppliers wishing to terminate supply contracts or invoking more draconian terms when the company is entering into certain insolvency procedures, a CVA, or a new restructuring plan or moratorium (as introduced by the Bill), (each an “Insolvency Procedure”).
The purpose behind the new provisions is to maximise the possibility of a company being rescued or being able to sell its business as a going concern by helping it to trade through an Insolvency Procedure.
The landlord argued that the force majeure clause did not apply at all for three primary reasons. The Bankruptcy Court rejected each of the landlord’s arguments.
This significant recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada confirms (i) that a CCAA supervising judge enjoys broad discretion and the necessary jurisdiction to prevent a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement when the creditor is acting for an improper purpose, and (ii) that litigation funding is not intrinsically illegal and that a litigation funding agreement can be approved by the Court as an interim financing in insolvency.
Cette importante décision prononcée dernièrement par la Cour suprême du Canada confirme : (i) que le juge chargé d’appliquer la LACC possède un vaste pouvoir discrétionnaire et la compétence nécessaire pour empêcher un créancier de voter sur un plan d’arrangement s’il agit dans un but illégitime, (ii) que le financement de litiges n’est pas intrinsèquement illégal et qu’un accord de financement de litige peut être approuvé par la Cour à titre de financement temporaire en situation d’insolvabilité.
This significant recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada confirms (i) that a CCAA supervising judge enjoys broad discretion and the necessary jurisdiction to prevent a creditor from voting on a plan of arrangement when the creditor is acting for an improper purpose, and (ii) that litigation funding is not intrinsically illegal and that a litigation funding agreement can be approved by the Court as an interim financing in insolvency.
Last week the UK government introduced the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill in Parliament.
The main objective of the Bill is to provide businesses with the flexibility and space needed to continue to trade during this difficult time caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. That said, the provisions around the new moratorium and the new restructuring plan proposal have been under consideration for a few years.
The Bill’s measures can be split into three categories:
In In re Palladino, 942 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2019), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a debtor receives “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for paying his adult child’s college tuition. The Palladino court answered this question in the negative, thereby contributing to the growing circuit split regarding the avoidability of debtors’ college tuition payments for their adult children as constructively fraudulent transfers.
Background
Wrongful Trading
On 14 May 2020, the UK Government extended the temporary suspension of wrongful trading liability until 30 June 2020.
In response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the British Columbia Supreme Court (the “Court”) has suspended regular operations at all of its locations from March 19th, 2020 to May 29th, 2020 (the “Suspension Period”).[1] In an effort to balance the seriousness of the situation with the principles of open courts and timely access to justice, the Court continues to hear certain “urgen