2019 was a momentous year for the energy sector: The U.S. became a net oil exporter for the first time in recorded history and at the same time energy dropped to less than five percent of the S&P 500 Index. With the precipitous drop in commodity prices and macroeconomic volatility triggered by the oil price war and COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 presents challenges and change for the global and domestic energy sectors. We thank all of our valued clients and look forward to working with you to anticipate and solve problems and capitalize on industry and global trends.
As the economic turbulence associated with the downturn in commodity prices and the outbreak of COVID-19 continues, many energy companies may find their debt trading at significant discounts. For companies trying to manage liability and liquidity, this presents an opportunity to selectively repurchase debt and de-lever at prices well below par. Energy companies that are well-situated to capitalize on this window should carefully consider the corporate and tax ramifications debt buybacks present.
Corporate Considerations
As the U.S. energy industry comes to grips with the most dire economic crisis in its history, wrought by an invisible virus and global oil price war, and with many exploration and production (E&P) producers substantially adjusting their capital and maintenance budgets, all parties must carefully assess their partners’ financial positions. The bankruptcy filing of a joint venture partner (whether operator or nonoperator) can lead to substantial problems for the other joint venture partner(s) and potentially hamstring operations on the co-owned lands.
In an effort to broaden his appeal to members of the left-leaning electorate, Joe Biden endorsed Senator Elizabeth Warren’s bankruptcy plan during this past weekend. Ms. Warren’s plan, a material piece of the platform from her former presidential bid, is focused on protecting struggling individual consumers by reducing bankruptcy costs, streamlining the process, and expanding debt forgiveness. Like many of her plans, Ms. Warren’s bankruptcy plan is detailed and generally includes the following proposals:
On April 4, 2020, the State of New York will join ranks with the vast majority of other states implementing a version of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “UVTA”). Only Maryland continues to apply the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (the “UFCA”), a law with its origins as early as 1918. A handful of other states that did not adopt the UFCA instead retain their varied, state-specific transfer laws. The uniform legislation was first promulgated in 1984 as an amendment to the UFCA, referred to as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”).
A new wave of bankruptcy filings for leveraged oil and gas companies has begun and this time it may involve more prepacks and less optimism. Beginning in late 2015 and continuing through 2017, downtown Houston was filled with bankruptcy lawyers. Highly leveraged exploration and production (or E&P) companies had become crippled by falling oil prices and the resulting impact on the value of their producing and non-producing reserves in their borrowing bases.
Going forward, lenders must take precautionary measures to protect themselves. Anticipating the risk of a U.S. bankruptcy case is a crucial first step.
The court noted that the DOJ might prosecute cannabis-related businesses under the CSA, notwithstanding plan confirmation. Thus, Garvin may have foreclosed any future DOJ CSA-based noneconomic objections to cannabis reorganizations.
Contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, the District Court concluded that California's liquidated damages statute does not apply to the default interest rate provision.
This is a favorable decision for commercial secured lenders. Although the ruling is not controlling on other bankruptcy courts as it is a trial court level ruling, courts may certainly consider it when presented with similar issues.
In In re 1111 Myrtle Avenue Group, LLC (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), a New York bankruptcy court held that a default interest rate provision of 7 percent was enforceable and not a penalty against a debtor, which retained significant equity postbankruptcy.
Background