Mortgage lenders should be aware of the New Jersey statute of limitations on mortgage foreclosure complaints. In In re Washington, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4649 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov.

In In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., No. 14-24287 (Bankr. D.N.J., Oct. 31, 2014), Judge Michael B. Kaplan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey held that trademark licenses may be entitled, under a bankruptcy court's equitable powers, to the protections of Section 365(n) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.

Section 1322(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code1 allows debtors to cure defaults and reinstate a 
mortgage on their principal residence "until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is 
conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law."2
 Like many provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, this one appears fairly straightforward at first glance; a debtor has the right to 
cure and reinstate a home mortgage until the property is sold at a foreclosure sale. 

Recently, in the case of In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Bankruptcy No. 14-12103 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4439 (Bankr. D. Del. October 20, 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed the issue of whether a debtor has the authority to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement pursuant to Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On April 14, in In re Free Lance-Star Publishing, 512 B.R. 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the objection of Chapter 11 debtors to a secured creditor's right to credit bid at a sale of the debtors' assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 363.

In the case of United States of America v. Edward P. Bond, No. 12-4803 (2d. Cir. August 13, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") issued a decision that could have far-reaching effects on how liquidating chapter 11 bankruptcy cases will be handled in the future.

Who Will Think of the Tenants: Split in Authority Regarding the Interplay Between Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(f) and 365(h)(1)(A)

The recent Eleventh Circuit case of In re Brown, 746 F.3d 1236 (2014) held that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2)'s replacement value standard applies even when a Chapter 7 or 13 debtor surrenders collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C). The Eleventh Circuit's decision in In re Brown has an important role in how personal property collateral will be valued in Chapter 7 and 13 cases in the Eleventh Circuit and thus its reasoning is important for creditors to understand.

In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit became the first federal circuit court of appeals to hold that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).[1] See No. 13-12389,__ F.3d __, 2014 WL 3361226 (11th Cir.

The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re: Princeton Office Park, L.P. v. Plymouth Park Tax Services, LLC, determined that under the Tax Sale Law, N.J.S.A. §§ 54:5-1 to -137, a purchaser of a tax sale certificate acquires a tax lien, not a lien securing the property owner's obligation to pay the amount owing to redeem the certificate.