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The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r

The English High Court in Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance S.A. and Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch) applied a common sense approach in the circumstances to the determination of Loss under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement. The judgment of the judge (Mr Justice David Richards) is useful reading for those involved in structured products and derivatives.

Background

In two recent decisions, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted an interpretation of Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (the “TIA”) that may complicate future exchange offers and, in some cases, force bond restructurings that might otherwise have been completed out-of-court to be effectuated through a bankruptcy filing.1  In Marblegate Asset Management v.

In another major development in a case that continues to redefine the standard procedures in asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings, on January 13, 2015, Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC announced that it had reached an agreement with the representative for future asbestos claimants that would settle all present and future asbestos claims for $358 million. The current net present value of the settlement is reportedly $205 million – considerably higher than the bankruptcy court’s liability estimate of $125 million, but well below the $1.3 billion plaintiffs had been seeking.

In In re BGI, Inc. f/k/a/ Borders Group, Inc.,1 the Second Circuit recently held that the doctrine of equitable mootness — a doctrine that permits appellate courts to refrain from hearing bankruptcy appeals relating to plan confirmation when it would be “inequitable” to do so – applies in liquidations under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. This ruling extends the doctrine from Chapter 11 reorganizations, in which it has traditionally been applied in the Second Circuit, to liquidations.

The Portland Press Herald reports that the bankruptcy trustee for Great Northern Paper has said there is sufficient evidence to pursue claims against the Company’s owners, officers and directors for breach of their fiduciary duties and breach of the duty of loyalty arising from the structuring and execution of a Maine new markets tax credit transaction.

For the past 15 years, trust preferred securities (TruPS) have constituted a significant percentage of the capital of many financial institutions, mostly bank holding companies.Their ubiquity, both as a source of capital and as a common investment for banks, made them a quiet constant for many financial institutions. Even in the chaos of the Great Recession, standard TruPS terms allowed for the deferral of interest payments for up to five years, easing institutions’ cash-flow burdens during those volatile times.